March 14, 2024

Stakeholder Identification and Community Engagement for Data Collection in Marginalised Populations

Community engagement blog

Ebonyi community engagement during December 2020 data collection on community-based intervention in the control of gender-based violence in Nigeria study (Source: Author)

Written by Aboluwaji Daniel Ayinmoro

Stakeholder identification and community involvement in research are increasingly considered as prerequisites for successful data collection procedures within the global discourse of community engagement. However, there is concern about the low participation of several marginalised populations in data gathering processes because of mistrust, resistance and dissatisfaction brought on by their limited access to opportunities and resources, which are necessary for them to fully participate in society and live a decent live. If this issue is not resolved, it could lead to inaccurate collection of data and insufficient evidence-based policy interventions for marginalised communities.

The situations of marginalised populations and poor participation in data collection

The number of marginalised groups in Nigeria is steadily rising as a result of poverty, conflicts, and natural disasters. The most vulnerable categories of people to the detrimental effects of this situations are those who live in slums, internally displaced people (IDPs), women and people living in rural riverine areas. This is because, among other things, they are the population most at risk of violence and having restricted access to resources like the health care system and portable water. Their level of poverty and social exclusion are made worse by these circumstances. Why poor participation in data collection? There are several reasons for poor participation in most evidence-based policy driven intervention programmes. First, a lack of feedback on the results of earlier data collection efforts has left community members excessively bored with data gathering process. Second, in certain marginalised groups, local authorities always hijack interventions. As a result, each researcher coming for data gathering must be screened by the local authorities before any data collection can begin.

Overcoming the challenges of poor participation in data collection process

There are measures that need to be made to address these difficulties in obtaining reliable data in marginalised areas, based on first-hand experiences in slum and community-based interventions research. The first step in data gathering procedures is to identify the stakeholders. This is necessary for sorting out all parties involved, direct or indirect, based on how the research's findings would impact them. Most studies that span marginalised populations often identify three categories of stakeholders: primary, secondary and key stakeholders.

- Primary stakeholders: They are the community people who stand to be directly affected either positively or negatively by the research efforts. The primary stakeholders in research conducted in most marginalised communities are the community members themselves, including their heads and leaders of community sub-groups (gate keepers and community champions), as they stand to gain from the findings.

Secondary stakeholders: They are the people who stand to be indirectly affected either positively or negatively by any research effort. The involvement of experts in the study of interest, such as health professionals for health interventions in communities is a good example of secondary stakeholder, while the involvement of community police officers in the study of community-based intervention in the control of gender-based violence is another example of secondary stakeholder.

Key stakeholders: The key stakeholders are people who belong to either or neither of the first two groups, who can have a positive or negative influence on a research effort. The involvement of the state’s ethics office and the directors in the ministry responsible for the area of research interest are good examples of key stakeholders. Additionally, the funder of a research project can also be regarded as a key stakeholder since their funding will impact significantly on the outcome of the research effort.

Stakeholder mapping or analysis is necessary after the different categories of stakeholders have been identified. This is where the researcher[s] ascertains which stakeholders can have the greatest positive or negative impact on the research project.

Engaging community stakeholders for robust data collection

Researchers are required to take certain actions depending on the responsibilities that various types of stakeholders play in a research project in order to address the issues of mistrust, resistance, and suspicion of researchers by marginalised community members. First, as a key stakeholder in marginalised communities, it is crucial to receive ethical clearance from the state's ethics office. This is where permission to execute the research is granted by the state authorities. Secondly, the inclusion of secondary stakeholders in research pertaining to marginalised populations is recommended, subject to the nature of the study and its relationship to policy interventions. This is because, in addition to validating the data gathering tool, their contributions as professionals on the subject of investigation would act as gatekeepers for the marginalised groups. For example, it is imperative that health professionals be involved in the state of health in slums based on their knowledge of related issues.

While the engagement of the secondary and key stakeholders in data collection procedures in marginalised populations is essential for a successful data collection, the procedures for the engagement of primary stakeholders are more critical. This is because the primary stakeholders do not only remain the direct beneficiaries of the research outcomes but are typically more vulnerable to social exclusion than other categories of stakeholders. However, following the engagement of the key and secondary stakeholders in a research effort or an intervention project, a proper community entry is expected to be done by first informing, consulting and brainstorming with community heads and other leaders of community associations on the focus of the research project. By doing this, it would have yielded high level of adherence to ethical standards and perhaps lowest level of resistance in data collection. Involving the heads of the communities and other sub-group leaders in outreach to the community is the next action that has to be taken. In order to gather data in their communities, it could be feasible to recruit and train them as research assistants. As a result, community people feel more involved in the research project and have more confidence in it. Following data collection, feedback and dissemination workshops are required, with participation from representatives of all stakeholders, including the media. Finally, should the study require supports or interventions from the funder, non-governmental organisations or the government to the community, its implementation must not be disregarded and monitored.

Key conclusion

The key to sustainable community engagement in research within any study population for successful data collection in Nigeria, is building enduring relationships with all stakeholders and making sure that research findings are shared with all subjects. In addition to this, if there is any intervention that arises from the findings of the research, its implementation should not be compromised.


Resources

BMJ Global Health: https://gh.bmj.com/content/5/8/e003042.abstract

Global Call to Action Against Poverty: https://gcap.global/coalition/nigeria-2/

Author’s bio

Aboluwaji Daniel Ayinmoro is a Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He has over five years of experience in teaching and research in Sociology, and Demography and Population Studies. He has expertise in community engagement and mixed-methods research that combines quantitative and qualitative approaches. He can be contacted via boluwajidaniel@ymail.com.


December 05, 2023

Encounters, dialogues and solutions for natural resource management and sustainable development

“L'homme n'est pas le maître de la terre, mais la terre est le maître de l'homme”: Encounters, dialogues and solutions for natural resource management and sustainable development in Côte d’Ivoire.

ipf blog 2 forest

A view of the Voluntary Natural Reserve(May 2023, Photo Credit, Adou Djané)

Written by:

Adou Djané, Briony Jones, Mouzayian Khalil-Babatunde, Sita Akoko Kondo, Dohouan Village Secretary, Dohouan Forest Guides, and Dohouan Women’s Association.

The current ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework requires actors to work together to realize sustainable development for all. However, we continue to see the dominance of top-down development despite the fact that local communities are vital for successful and legitimate development interventions. In this blog we present one particular local community action which is part of a joint project on natural resource management in Côte d’Ivoire. Our project “L'homme n'est pas le maître de la terre, mais la terre est le maître de l'homme”: Encounters, dialogues and solutions for natural resource management and sustainable development in Côte d’Ivoire is funded by the University of Warwick as part of an International Partnership Fund and is a collaboration between the Centre Suisse de Recherche Scientifique en Côte d’Ivoire (CSRS) and the University of Warwick. It is also a collaboration with local communities working to manage their natural resources, and it is for this reason that the blog is co-authored by the project partners as well as the local communities interviewed in the framework of this project. What this blog describes is an example of an effective constellation of collaborations for activism to protect a primary rainforest on the border between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.

In May 2023 we gathered in the village of Dohouan, in the South-East of Côte d’Ivoire and close to the border with Ghana. It is here that the Tanoe-Ehy Forest is situated, one of the last areas of rainforest in the country, home to three of the most endangered primates in the region, and under threat from conversion to palm oil plantations. We spoke together about the successful block in the expansion of palm oil plantation, and the designation of the forest as a Voluntary Natural Reserve by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire. Two themes are clear in the conversations that we had: (1) for the importance of future generations being able to see, enjoy, and use the forest; and (2) the importance of collaborative action combining local, regional and national actors.


ipf blog 1

Meeting with the community representatives (May 2023, Photo Credit, Adou Djané)

“Tous, on est impliqué”

These words of the Village Secretary: “We are all responsible” sum up the successful action to block the palm oil plantation expansion into Tanoe-Ehy Forest.

In the 1980s and 1990s, structural adjustment policies, advised by international financial institutions, were implemented in Côte d’Ivoire. This included the privatisation of the previously state-owned Palm industries in 1997. The assets of the company were bought by three private enterprises, significantly reducing the land ownership of smallholders in palm oil producing areas.

The forest is a valuable resource not only for the palm oil companies but for the local communities. There is a daily pleasure in seeing the forest, knowing the names of plants and animals, and being able to use the resources of the forest. This includes plants for medicine, wood for construction of buildings, and the use of flora and fauna in important cultural ceremonies. Successfully saying ‘no’ to the palm oil plantation in the rainforest adjacent to Dohouan is an important example of local community activism in the context of contested management of natural resources.

“Que la fôret demeure fôret”

When asked about key priorities, a group of village representatives told us that first and foremost they wished “the forest to be a forest”.

Supported by a network of voluntary forest guides, the rainforest is protected, and its use managed. The forest guides take great pleasure in the voluntary nature of their work, both directly preserving the forest through patrols and indirectly through educating the local population about the importance of sustainable management of the forest. There are now limits as to how much wood can be used from the forest, which plants can be taken out, a ban on hunting, and limitations placed on fishing.

Before the forest was designated a Voluntary Natural Reserve the local communities in the area participated in workshops to help to decide and define regulations for its management and protection. Representatives of the Government were present to advise on the different options available, but it was the local population who agreed together to request a Voluntary Natural Reserve.

“Je le fait pas pour moi, mais pour les générations de l’avenir”

The fight to save the forest is framed by local residents as a commitment to future generations, as this quote from the forest guides illustrates: I am doing it not for me, but for future generations”. However, this was not simply a question of local community versus oil plantation company, it was a sustained effort over time through a network of collaborations and associations spanning different levels of governance.

The CSRS first began working with the local communities in the area in 2006, supporting activities around education to counter some depleting local practices while at the same time preserving the forest and its role in community life and sustenance. This initiative by CSRS “captured their attention” and it was then that “the idea of conservation was born”, according to the President of the Fishermen’s Association. It was the CSRS who accompanied local associations on visits to the relevant government ministries, provided information about the rights of the local communities, and supported the workshops which evolved and manifested in the request for classification of the forest as a voluntary natural reserve.

The outcome was a victory for the forest, it is protected and preserved. But it is still an ongoing journey of negotiation between different actors. The forest crosses the border with Ghana, and lack of adequate coordination, partly due to will and partly due to resources, undermine what should be a shared conservation effort. Lack of resources also undermine the work of the forest guides who do not have access to basic equipment such as walkie talkies or permanent patrol posts which would allow them to do their work in the remote setting of the forest.

“L’union fait la force”

These words, spoken by the President of the Fishermen’s Association: “together we’re stronger”, certainly seems a foundation for the past, present and planned activities of conserving the forest.

But this union has cracks, not least a feeling that since the official designation of the forest as a voluntary natural reserve, that the state has washed its hands of supporting in its management. Tensions between Ghanaian and Ivoirian Forest patrols as well as between Ghanaian and Ivoirian fishermen require time and resources to manage sensitively and fairly.

Resources

Recherches et Actions pour la Sauvegarde des Primates en Côte d’Ivoire CI (RASAPCI)

Où sont les colobes rouges de Miss Waldron?, Nature et Environnement

Authors’ Bio

This blog is written collaboratively by researchers in the Centre Suisse de Recherche Scientifique en Côte d’Ivoire (CSRS), the Department of Politics and International Studies University of Warwick, and representatives of the village of Dohouan in the South-East of Côte d’Ivoire by the border with Ghana. The blog is an output of our research project“L'homme n'est pas le maître de la terre, mais la terre est le maître de l'homme”: Encounters, dialogues and solutions for natural resource management and sustainable development in Côte d’Ivoire, funded by the University of Warwick as part of an International Partnership Fund (2022-2024).


October 31, 2023

‘Responsibility To Protect’ in Libya: A Post–colonial and Feminist Analysis

R2P blog image

Photo: Libya celebrates one-year anniversary of anti-Gaddafi uprising. Copyright UN Photo/Iason Foounten

Written by: Sol Rodriguez

The UN intervention in Libya marked a turning point in history, and the future of R2P. Stated by the outcome of the World Summit in 2005, R2P recognizes that a state can lose its sovereignty in the case of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. If any of these crimes occur and the state fails to act, the International Community has the legitimacy to intervene. Under Pillar 3 of R2P, it can be through peaceful and diplomatic strategies, or through coercive and military options.

While R2P has acquired many supporters due to its humanitarian message, its military operation in Libya increased the scepticism surrounding its objectives and consequences. In fact, Libya is now used as a hard proof confirming old suspicious that R2P can be abused for political purposes.

The Arab Spring and the Reaction by the International Community

The conflict in Libya, which took place in 2011, is contextualized within the “Arab Spring”, a movement understood as a pro-democracy movement where civilians were protesting against autocratic governments while demanding greater freedom and democracy.

In Libya, demonstrations against the country’s leader Gaddafi rapidly turned violent and the UNSC reminded the leader of his duty to protect his population. Violence escalated, and Gaddafi was accused of human rights violations. Resolution 1970 was accepted unanimously on February 2011 but given the lack of success, Resolution 1973 was adopted on March, giving authorization to take all necessary measures to protect the population, including military force. While no country voted against it, countries including China, Russia and Germany voted with abstention.

A Postcolonial and Feminist Critique of R2P

It is argued that R2P seems to advocate for Western values, reinforcing a binary and unequal relationship between the West and the rest (Other). Western values are considered universal and wanted by everyone. The speeches of the West talked about “duty” and “peace”. Intervention is perceived as moral obligation, as cultural correctness. Nonetheless, it is argued that R2P languages hides a paternalistic discourse in which Western societies have the moral responsibility to civilize the “Other”.

Furthermore, R2P reproduces underlying colonial stereotypes. It rests on a “self VS other” dichotomy, constructing the identity of the West as heroic, the guarantors of universal values, and of the “Other” as either a victim or as an uncivilized barbarian. The conflict in Libya was explained in simplified terms based on racial stereotypes. Gaddafi and his loyalists were criminals VS the (white) benevolent saviours in the quest for helping the victims and fighting the (brown) perpetrators.

Moreover, the language employed in R2P reproduces gender stereotypes. It views women in essentialist terms, portraying them either as victims or as ideal peacebuilders. Libyan women were described as targets of Gaddafi's brutality that had to be rescue. Whereas they played a key role sparking the revolution and in the overthrow of Gaddafi's regime, in the international sphere they were stripped of their agency and their performance was barely acknowledged. Following that women are among the vulnerable population, the likelihood of deployment of military force is more likely to be used to protect them.[1]

Additionally, R2P language can be argued to entail a marginalization effect on other collectives since women are prioritized.[2] Other collectives might be overviewed since they are considered “vulnerable”.

Discourse Strategies Used to Justify a Military Response

- Oversimplified conflict: Libyans were described as all together against a dictator. The audience pictures Libyans as united country whose only desire is to have rights. Although the opposition shared the goal to remove Gaddafi from power, the group of the rebels consisted of different groups seeking influence over the future of the country.

- The construction of the threat: the International Community used the language of immediateness and demonised Gaddafi to justify the use of force, a measure that in “normal” situations is not approved. Regional support and a legal basis were required too, so that intervention was not seen as a unilateral move by the West.

- Rape-as-a-weapon narrative: The claim of systematic sexual violence by Gaddafi´s with a political aim rests mainly on three rather thin and disputatious stories: Eman al-Obeidi´s story, Viagra was said to be distributed, and a Libyan psychologist announced that she identified over 200 victims of rape. Although there were doubts about the allegations and investigations were still in place, this did not stop the International Community to use the rape-as-a-tool narrative to demand a military operation. After the intervention, the ICC published a report in which they classified the sexual claims as speculative. Rather than being used as a tool with a political objective, rape occurred due to the lack of control and security at the time and was committed by all parties.

Conclusion

Intervention in Libya was a moral imperative that seemed to align with the security interests of the West. That is, although intervention was justified in humanitarian terms, critics have argued that a regime change was the ultimate goal pursued. Now, a decade after R2P implementation, the country is ruled by conflict and chaos. Not only does establishing a stable democracy seem to be impossible due to disputes and disagreements between rival factions after Gaddafi´s death, but also, they are currently facing the flood caused by Storm Daniel. The head of the World Meteorological Organization stated that the impact of such storm was much greater given the divided country.

Author Bio:

Sol Rodriguez is an undergraduate student in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of Warwick. This blog is part of the URSS scheme run by Warwick. The latter sponsors students to conduct their own research project working with an academic during the summer.



[1] Carpenter.R 2012. Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms, and the Protection of Civilians. Burlington, VT: Ashgate; Enloe, C. 2000. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women´s Lives Berkeley: University of California Press

[2] Kolmasova, S. and Krulisova, K. 2019. Legitimizing Military Action through ‘Rape-as-a-Weapon’ Discourse in Libya: Critical Feminist Analysis, Politics & Gender. Cambridge University Press, 15(1), pp. 130–150. doi: 10.1017/S1743923X18000326.


October 09, 2023

Conflicting Narratives on Development and Environment in Argentina

lithium exploitation in Argentina

Source: Photo credits ‘no-al-litio’: Ramiro Barreiro, Latfem.org

Conflicting Narratives on Development and Environment in Argentina. What can we learn from lithium exploitation in Argentina?


Written by Mariana Paterlini

Argentina is an unequal country where the gap between the rich and the poor keeps widening, while its economy still depends on large-scale agriculture for export. However, since the 90s, and influenced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, mining has emerged as a potential source of economic growth. Furthermore, in the last ten years, the Northwest region has gained visibility as part of the "lithium triangle". Along with Bolivia and Chile, this area concentrates 85% of the world's reserves of this crucial metal for the energy transition. Simultaneously, the consolidation of different actors questioning the benefits and negative impacts of the dominant development model has increased over the last twenty years, giving rise to a national scenario populated by environmental conflicts.

Lithium is often presented as a critical mineral in the transition to renewable energy. Currently, governments in the North promote its exploration and, in line with their international environmental commitments, link it to sustainable mining contributing to decarbonisation. Thus, it reproduces a Modernity discourse that conceives the environment and its resources as commodities ready to serve the human economic organisation. However, its extraction implies intensive water use that alters soil conditions and negatively impacts the ecosystem, thus an exploitation of the environment. Furthermore, this practice often violates the rights of local communities. Specifically, indigenous peoples who have remained marginalised since colonial times.

This research, conducted as the dissertation to finish an International Development MA at the University of Warwick, examined cultural products related to lithium exploitation circulating in national media, guided by a transdisciplinary theoretical framework that merges postcolonial development studies, political ecology, and sociology of culture, through discourse analysis. This approach made it possible to engage with how diverse actors conceptualise their relationships with the environment differently and consider Argentina's position in relation to the current centres of economic power. Then, five development narratives were identified while observing the relation of each model with the environment, the reproduction of colonialism each one entails and their efforts towards an ideal of emancipation for the country.

Here culture is thought of as a historical process anchored in common sense, habits, and beliefs which materialise the social relations of inequality between different groups involved. Therefore, exploring the cultural dynamics in the case of lithium exploitation makes it possible to decentre the hegemonic development narrative and expand the political imagination presenting alternative possibilities at stake.

The five development narratives identified through this exercise -orthodox extractivism, extractivism with industrialisation, green new deal (GND), degrowth, and community autonomism-shape heterogeneous ways of materialising human relations with nature. Moreover, they entail fields of possibilities and practices with which different groups can identify and between which relations of opposition or articulation are established, considering the power disputes across them. Therefore, based on the frequency of circulation, the actors legitimising the narratives and the media outlet in which they circulate, orthodox extractivism and extractivism with industrialisation are residual narratives, GND is the dominant one, and degrowth and community autonomism are the emergent.

Regarding the environment, whereas residual models assimilate it as natural resources intended to be exploited intensively (lithium appears as a commodity that brings in foreign currency, referred to as the "new oil", "white gold", or a "hidden treasure", allowing local communities to leave their "primitive" original state), the dominant model frames this exploitation within environmental standards that remain unclear (lithium appears as key for an energy transition, and refer as part of a "sustainable mining" linked to accountability and efficiency). In contrast, the emergent narratives understand the environment as the co-creation of a relationship between the biophysical and its inhabitants, entailing caring relationships (indigenous peoples expose how their identities and culture disappear if their ecosystem dies). Connected to this arises the question of its management. While the residual and the dominant narratives discuss it in terms of strategic resources that provincial or national governments may administer, the emerging models stress recognising the legitimate participation of indigenous communities and organised civil society in the debate.

Regarding emancipation, orthodox extractivism is the only narrative that does not envision emancipation and reproduces colonial relations between the North and the South, assimilating development to economic growth. On the other hand, extractivism with industrialisation, GND, degrowth and community autonomism include an emancipatory aspect. Nonetheless, their understanding of emancipation differs; the two former links it to improving Argentina's position in the global market, neglecting power inequalities within the country, and understanding economic growth as the basis of development. The latter consider emancipation from a bottom-up perspective, undervaluing economic growth as the basis of development and connecting it to a shift in the relationship with the environment.

Finally, in the residual and dominant narratives, it is possible to trace persistence of the Modernity discourse with nuances, reproducing the marginalisation of local communities and focusing on the country's position within global dynamics. In this way, they neglect the differentiated impact these dynamics have in different sectors, particularly the negative consequences on already marginalised communities. On the other hand, the emergent models openly challenge this discourse, emphasising the reinforcement of local aspects to reverse the undesired effects of the current global ones.

This study showed that although emergent narratives usually appear on critical and alternative media outlets, they circulate in mainstream media to a lesser extent. Therefore, it made it possible to think that new futures, engaged with alternative development models, can be shaped by the massification of some unusual alliances already occurring in this arena. Thus, it might be relevant to delve deeper into the strategies for consolidating these unusual alliances while generating evidence to identify whether they effectively contribute to counteracting the reproduction of inequality.

Whilst the hegemonic development discourse aims to improve Argentina's position in the global system, it reproduces mechanisms that exacerbate the differentiated impact of this development model on different sectors of the population, producing environmental damages and more inequality. This analysis sought to deepen understanding of this situation and demonstrate alternative ways forward. The final goal remains on the side of hope and advocates for the plural construction of a development model intersected by the values of social justice, in which the motto of the Sustainable Development Goals becomes a reality: leaving no one behind.

Author Bio

Mariana Paterlini has recently graduated with an MA in International Development at the University of Warwick. She is a human rights activist whose practice has focused on feminism, gender rights, economic, social, and cultural rights and, more recently, the right to the future. Her master's dissertation addressed continuities and ruptures traceable in the narratives circulating in the public debate on development and the environment in Argentina. She was a Chevening scholar, and this piece was made possible by funding from the Chevening Scholarships, the UK government's global scholarship programme, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).


January 11, 2023

Lurching from crisis to crisis: A reflection of ‘neglect’ and Ebola in Uganda

Lurching from crisis to crisis: A reflection of ‘neglect’ and Ebola in Uganda

Ebola Uganda

Source: Flickr (UNMEER)

Written by: Sharifah Sekalala

On 21 December 2022, the president of the Republic of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, declared Uganda Ebola free, because it hadn’t reported a new case for 42 days – the criterion set by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Although the Ugandan Ebola crisis had, since 20 September, infected 142 people, 55 confirmed dead, including 8 school children and 7 health workers, the ‘end’ of the crisis didn’t even make many international headlines. It is true that these numbers are relatively small, but monkey pox which garnered huge global headlines killed only 22 people.

The paradox of perpetual crisis and neglect in global health

Uganda has faced five previous Ebola crises (2000-2001, 2007-2008, 2011, 2012-2013, 2018-2020). Patient zero for the 2022 crisis was a young man with the Sudan variant which had no known vaccine. Before 2016, when a mass outbreak in West Africa spread to many European countries, Ebola crises were primarily ignored by the international community. In the aftermath of the 2016 crisis, Joao Nunes used the term neglect to refer to diseases such as Ebola which are only recognised as a threat when they spread to life in the global north.

At the crux of this neglect is the way in which global health law recognises crises. In order to meet the WHO’s threshold for a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), a disease must cross borders. Therefore, countries like Uganda, which have managed to contain numerous public health crises within their borders, are often ignored.

Reaching the threshold of a PHEIC not only garners international attention but also allows developing countries to access funding, such as pandemic bonds. In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, when the World Bank initially refused to pay, Bangin Brim and Clare Wenham accused the World Bank’s financing facility of being focused on paying out to investors over countries in need and creating a threshold in which the only realistic way in which poor countries can claim from this fund is if diseases spread across national borders.

Additionally, as Patricia Kingori has argued, the language of crises is framed within narratives with a singular beginning and end, which ignores the fact that some countries and communities remain in perpetual health crisis. This framing of crises that have a singular beginning and end neglects the experiences of huge parts of the world whose crises are becoming more frequent and more complex as zoonotic diseases spread from animals to humans, diseases mutate and spread faster due to globalisation but also due to increased environmental impacts from climate change in many parts of the world.

The crisis of care amidst depleted systems

The Ebola crisis in Uganda was also a crisis within broader social economic crises. The country was still struggling with the 2020 COVID-19 crisis, with only 13 million people out of 50 million people fully vaccinated, other infectious diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV on the rise, and an economic crises caused by a prolonged period of lockdown.

Health workers were particularly affected with them forming 26 percent of infections. Yet again, the Ebola Crisis in Uganda resuscitated old debates about the adequacy of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for frontline workers. Frontline workers also accused the government of failing to pay them appropriately. 17 percent of all those infected were children which led to early school closures, with schools being closed two weeks early. This had a huge impact, as children in Uganda had already been subjected to the longest period of school closures in the world.

Countries that are perpetually in crisis rely on families for care, especially women. In Uganda, women are often the main caregivers in their homes, communities, and health facilities, which puts them at higher risk of illness. Rai et al. use the term ‘depletion’ to refer to the way in which the human energy needed for caring is hard to replenish. Low- and Middle-Income Countries like Uganda face depletion during crises, not only of frontline workers but also of women who continue to care when systems such as schools can no longer continue.

Vaccines and global neglect

Although Ebola was discovered more than 19 years ago, the vaccines that had been developed for the previous Ebola crisis were not effective on the Sudan Strain. The ways in which vaccines are researched, produced and distributed has come under increasing scrutiny, with rich countries being accused of vaccine colonialism, because although many countries took part in vaccine trials, once they were produced, rich countries hoarded vaccine doses, leaving many countries in the global south without access.

The proposed vaccine trials for the new Sudan variant highlights these global inequalities. Although the WHO lauded the fact that it took only 79 days to deliver trial vaccines, the vaccine trial which cost 9 million dollars has now been put on hold. As the prestigious journal Science had observed, ‘Uganda’s disappearing Ebola outbreak challenges vaccine testing.’ Because Uganda had done so well containing the Ebola outbreak, the waning number of cases made it difficult to create a ring trial, which is only effective if given to contacts of known cases.

The absence of a vaccine for the Sudan strain raises broader questions about the research and production of vaccines for diseases that are neglected. Although the trial included Ugandan scientists, the trial vaccines were produced in the global north, and the international community needed to raise US$9 million for a disease that has been endemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. This leaves the entire global community still vulnerable to a disease for which we may have had a cure if were not for neglect.

Author Bio

Sharifah Sekalala is a Professor of Global Health Law at the University of Warwick. Prof Sekalala is primarily interested in global health crises and the impact of law in curbing inequalities. Her research is focused primarily on Sub Saharan Africa and she is currently PI on a Wellcome-Trust-funded project on digital health apps in Sub-Saharan Africa. Prof Sekalala also serves as an Associate Fellow of Chatham House’s Global Health Program and the Chair of the Human Rights Working Group of the Global Health Law Consortium. This piece was made possible by funding from the Connaught Foundation Grant No: 512634 and Warwick Law School’s Impact Fund.


December 15, 2022

Data–based humanitarianism in Nigeria and South Sudan

D and D camp

Source: Data and Displacement Project Fieldwork

Written by: Funke Fayehun, Briony Jones, Leben Moro and Vicki Squire

This blog from members of the Data and Displacement team explores barriers that emerge in the context of data-driven approaches to humanitarian protection.i

How far can a data-driven approach to humanitarian protection foster increased participation and improved outcomes for IDPs? We address this question based on an analysis of interviews with displaced persons (IDPs) and stakeholders in Northeastern Nigeria and South Sudan. Our findings highlight the ways that the production and use of data in itself generates challenges for the participation of affected communities, with protection outcomes compromised by a range of contextual, specific and systemic barriers.

Northeastern Nigeria and South Sudan

Northeastern Nigeria has seen terrorism and armed conflict over a number of years, including insurgencies by the Boko Haram sect in the 1990s, later allied with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). This has led to deaths, the loss of livelihood and key support systems, and multiple displacements. Findings from our research suggest that there are lapses in the data ecosystems in Nigeria, with likely consequences of imprecise and inaccurate data on humanitarian assistance and planning.

South Sudan gained independence on 9 July 2011, enabling the return of millions of displaced persons. However, due to the outbreak of civil war in 2013, ongoing political battles and intense violence, largely along ethnic lines, has caused catastrophic repercussions for civilians. As of 2021, 2.34 million South Sudanese were refugees in neighboring countries while another 1.615 million were IDPs. Despite resolution in 2018, our research indicates that the generation and management of data on IDPs in the country have significant shortcomings.

Exploring the Challenges:

1. Technological and infrastructural barriers

In Northeastern Nigeria, there are both personnel and equipment gaps, which limit capacities for data collection and storage. The lack of equipment and well-trained personnel limits the coherence of data storage and handling processes, which differ across organizations. Divergent data banks across institutions and actors, along with reliability and systematisation issues in some cases, mean that there is a multiplicity of data.

Most South Sudanese NGOs do not generate sufficient and reliable financial resources by which to acquire the necessary expertise and material resources. UN agencies and international organisations are better positioned to acquire and deploy the required capacity to generate and manage data. Representatives of international organisations that we interviewed confirmed use of tablets to undertake headcounts and profiling for returns.

2. Procedural and Administrative barriers in defining vulnerability

Both stakeholders and IDPs highlight irregularities in the classification and identification of the most vulnerable IDPs in camps in Northeastern Nigeria. Many ‘fall through the cracks’ of protection because classification issues both at the point of registration and within the data subsequently collected for planning purposes lead to many needing help being overlooked.

While some stakeholders in South Sudan are involved in projects targeting vulnerable groups as well as general protection needs, many IDPs who we interviewed in camps suggest that the needs of some vulnerable people are not addressed. Those likely to ‘fall through the cracks’ of protection are victims of sexual violence, which is a significant but culturally sensitive issue in South Sudan.

3. Ethical barriers

There is an inconsistent and inappropriate ethical system for data collection from IDPs in Northeastern Nigeria. Many IDPs describe consent as verbal, without proper recording or written documentation and with limited information. In some instances, data collectors do not directly obtain consent from IDPs, but instead, go ahead with data collection after stating the purpose and approval from higher authorities.

In South Sudan some IDPs interviewed for this study expressed distrust or fear about people coming to collect data from them. Some IDPs agreed to give consent because their community leaders agreed to the data collection, and some complain that those who collect data from them do not return and fail to provide feedback.

4. Systemic barriers

Technological innovations intersect with donor pressure, donor agendas, and our research highlights the role of inter-agency competition over finite resources and funding. Data-driven humanitarian assistance is clearly a contested terrain with implications for IDP participation and humanitarian outcomes. Our research indicates that IDPs often have different understandings to humanitarian practitioners of the value of sharing data and expectations of what it should be used for. One told us:

‘I did not ask them. I would want to ask them, but I did not, they came to collect data like you are doing now, but they disappeared’

Conclusion

In reviewing data-driven humanitarian assistance in IDP camps in Northeastern Nigeria and South Sudan, our research points to a range of barriers to improving protection outcomes: technological and infrastructural, procedural and administrative, as well as ethical. Our findings suggest that this requires further investment in personnel and technological infrastructure, more careful attention to classification processes in the identification of vulnerability and need, plus improved ethical practices that take informed consent seriously.

Profile of Authors:

Funke Fayehun, Associate Professor and Head of Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan

Briony Jones, Reader of International Development, Politics and International Studies Department, University of Warwick.

Leben Moro, Director of the Directorate of Scientific and Cultural External Relations, University of Juba.

Vicki Squire, Professor of International Studies, Politics and International Studies Department, University of Warwick.

Notes:

[i] Data and Displacement: Assessing the Practical and Ethical Implications of Targetting Humanitarian Protection is funded by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (AHRC-FCDO) Collaborative Humanitarian Protection Programme (grant AH/T007516/1). We would like to thank the wider research team for their work on this project, including João Porto de Albuquerque, Dallal Stevens, Rob Trigwell, Ọláyínká Àkànle, Modesta Alozie, Kuyang Harriet Logo, Prithvi Hirani, Grant Tregonning, Stephanie Whitehead, HajjaKaka Alhaji Mai, Abubakar Adam, Omolara Popoola, Silvia De Michelis, Ewajesu Opeyemi Okewumi, Mauricio Palma-Gutiérrez, Funke Caroline Williams and Oluwafunto Abimbola. The project team undertook a total of 140 semi-structured qualitative interviews in Northeastern Nigeria and South Sudan, 100 with IDPs and 40 with practitioners, split equally across the two locations. The team has also conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with a total of 42 humanitarians who have expertise in data and information management, from across a range of international organisations and NGOs. We would also like to extend our thanks to Annika Sirikulthada, a University of Warwick Research Assistant who suported preparation of the blog.


October 19, 2022

Informal networks as sources of healthcare support

Informal networks as sources of healthcare support: How slum dwellers cope with health challenges by talking to each other

Informal health support

Photo by Sheyi Owolabi on Unsplash

Blog written by Chinwe Onuegbu

Access to quality healthcare is a fundamental human right, but this remains a struggle for people living in slums in low and middle-income countries. The term “slum” can be controversial but it is used in this article, in line with a larger project under which the research described in this article is based, to describe poor urban settlements characterised by overcrowding, poor housing structures and an overall shortage of social and health amenities. Globally, one in eight people reside in slums or poor urban settings, and in many African countries, including Nigeria, about 60% or city dwellers live in slums. Public health services in urban cities do not sufficiently cater to people living in the slums, and many are unable to obtain the comprehensive formal healthcare they need.

Staying healthy and fit is particularly essential for people living in slums. Many engage in informal jobs with daily wages, and maintaining health is crucial for maintaining daily household income.

In the face of inadequate formal healthcare services, slum dwellers turn to alternative healthcare options. It is important that we begin to understand these alternatives in order to mitigate any negative consequences and to amplify potential synergies.

My PhD study within the NIHR-funded slum health project

My PhD project was nested within the NIHR funded slum health unit at Warwick Medical School. The unit worked collaboratively with universities in Asia and Africa to map and understand use of health services in slums across both continents.

With my background in Sociology, I recognised the untapped opportunity to explore how health was managed beyond formal medical settings in the slums. My thesis explored a phenomenon known as lay consultation: how people manage illnesses and health challenges by talking to informal network members (e.g. family, friends and neighbours) or other informal online forums or resources (e.g., Facebook friends) beyond medical settings. My study population were the working-age adults in slums in Ibadan (Oyo state), Nigeria, and they were chosen because they were more likely to migrate in and out of the slums, be engaged in work that make them unable to seek care when needed and are likely to own and use mobile devices. These dynamics can shape lay consultation behaviours and network composition. The project adopted a mixed method approach. First, a survey to map how common lay consultation was, which network members were contacted and how influential were informal network members in determining people’s treatment behaviours. Next, interviews were conducted to understand in more depth the connections between speaking to others about a medical problem and actions taken afterwards. The study was done in collaboration with partners from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

The study found that most people experiencing illnesses consulted 1-3 network members including family, friends and neighbours. People navigated through the complexities of social life in slums such as having fewer networks due to busy life and difficulties in having trusted or dependable sources of support, to find people they could talk to. Participants rarely used online informal networks, mainly because many did not have access to such devices, had limited digital literacy, or preferred physical networks. The informal consultations were largely unplanned and taken-for-granted as they were ingrained in everyday life. Yet, within those informal conversations, were exchanges of advice and support- some useful and some not, that shaped how people managed illness experiences.

A striking finding from this study was that, despite living in the slums where the harsh conditions may drive over-reliance on informal networks for health maintenance, slum dwellers were highly agentic in using advice or support from others. People had strategies for coping with health challenges which included ability to assess the relevance of advice they received. Occasionally, they consulted other informal health providers such as local medicine vendors (known locally as ‘chemists’) and traditional healers to confirm advice they received from their network members.

So what?

We now know from this study that lay consultation, that is talking to informal network members, is a common way of managing illnesses in slums. The conversations- whether intended or unintended- contribute to management of personal health. There is a potential to leverage on informal networks to improve knowledge about health conditions and health care access, thereby contributing to strengthening of the health system in poor urban settings. Informal networks, including those existing online, should be recognised as an integral part of the overall health system, and incorporated into health policies and programmes as a means of increasing the coverage and effectiveness of health interventions.

Next steps:

The next step involves working with collaborators at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria on an intervention around lay consultation for slum communities in Ibadan, Nigeria. Our initial idea is to co-design an online health-resource that would provide formal, verified and accessible health advice for people living in the slums. People feeling ill or having health challenges can consult the online resource as part of steps taken to inform their health-seeking decisions. We will work with policy makers, community members and concerned organisations such as NGOs to co-design and promote the resource.

An internal seed fund grant has been obtained from the Warwick International Partnership fund (IPF) to kick start this project. The funding will be used to:

  • Disseminate findings from the PhD to study participants, key stakeholders and the general public,
  • Engage representatives of slum communities and public health policy makers at the state level in Nigeria to assess the value of lay consultation as an intervention to improve health outcomes
  • Build a multidisciplinary collaborative research team from across public health, information technology and social science and other stakeholders (such as Non-Governmental Organizations) for future research on leveraging lay consultation for health benefits in the slums.

In conclusion, interventions that are bottom-up, innovative and interdisciplinary approaches have the potential to tackle the complex issues in slums. The PhD project and planned intervention discussed in this blog exemplify how the intersection between social science and health science can improve health in slums.

Author Bio:

Chinwe Onuegbu is a Research Fellow at the Division of Health Sciences, Warwick Medical School, University of Warwick, UK. She recently completed her PhD in Health Sciences at Warwick Medical School. Her research interests include the social determinants of health in resource-constraint settings, and the role of information and communication technology (ICT) in healthcare in low- and middle-income countries. She is also interested in research communication and hosts a Research chat show on YouTube in her free time.


September 21, 2022

Colonial legacies, race and the labour market in Trinidad and Tobago

colonial legacies blog

Photo by Rashmi Mathur [The Trinidad & Tobago flag at sunrise]

Colonial Legacies, Race and the Labour Market in Trinidad and Tobago

Written by: Jamelia Harrisand Gianluc Robinson

Recent years have seen increased calls for equality and social justice. In many so-called developed countries, the movement has manifested in efforts to renameplaces, remove/replacestatues and decolonisethe curriculum. In former colonial countries, the renaming, replacing and re-writing is not new, and for some started decades ago. For example, there has been a Caribbean flavour to the syllabus, pedagogy and assessment in the English-speaking Caribbean since the establishment of the Caribbean Examination Council(CXC) in 1972; and the South African curriculum has gone through a plethora of changessince 1994. Several countries reclaimedtheir names post-independence – among them are Belize, St Kitts and Nevis, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe, and most recently Eswatini. We no longer speak of Bombay, but Mumbai; and Kolkata rather than Calcutta.

These examples highlight that the ‘decolonisation’ movement is not new in former-colonial states. These countries have long tried to shake the colonial chains and reclaim their identities. Many efforts have been successful as indicated above. Some are more challenging, especially those that are built on deep-rooted institutions.

Institutionsare the rules of the game with respect to how social, political and economic systems are organised and function. They are influenced by social interactions, and oftentimes formalised by laws and regulations. As expected, early institutions shape contemporary ones, and ultimately affect current outcomes. They determinehow a country, its economy and society, prospers (or not). This is true in Trinidad and Tobago – a small island nation in the Caribbean, and former British colony. Although sugar plantations (and agriculture in general) play a limited role in Trinidad and Tobago’s economy sixty years after independence(in 1962), race relations/tensions that were bred and nurtured doing the colonial period continue today, and rears its head in the labour market (among other aspects of society).

The ‘origin’ story

British colonialism in the West Indies used a model of division to control, which “fragments, divides, marginalizes, alienates, and represses certain groups”. These divisions were often institutionalised in laws and policies, and have a high probability of shaping contemporary institutions and development prospects. In Trinidad and Tobago, one of these divisions lay between the Afro- and Indo- Trinidadian communities.

From 1845, seven years after ‘Apprenticeship’ ended in 1838, East Indians (from India) were “imported into Trinidad” to work on sugar plantations as indentured labourers. Remuneration of the indentured labourers undercut that of the former enslaved, and the indentured labourers were offered the promise of land in exchange for relinquishing their free passage home. This, understandably, created tensions between the two groups – which played out in a society already “pervaded by the racist ideology of local and metropolitan whites.”

The subsequent institutionalisation of the Westminster system of government in Trinidad and Tobago hosted, and arguably perpetuated, one contemporary manifestation of this division in the area of race and politics, with one main party predominantly supported by the Afro-Trinidadian population, and the other supported by the Indo-Trinidadian population. Race and politics often enterthe labour market, and debates around these issues emerge most strongly in the lead up to general elections.

Contemporary manifestations

There is a high level of perceived racism in employment. Both the Afro and Indo populations claim to experience levels of racism in hiring and treatment in the workplace. Most studies acknowledge that this may be driven by perceptions on disparities in position, education, access to credit or resources such as loans. Perceptions on racial discrimination interplay with perceived political affiliation as politicians are suspected of providing their supporters and constituents with access to more opportunities and resources than the opposing side.

Recorded historical evidence on differences in positions between Afro, Indo and other races have influenced perceptions. In the immediate post-independence years, mixed, white, Chinese and Syrian populations tended to occupy higher levels of management and business ownership despite comparative or less training or education. Into the 2000s, Afro-Trinidadians weremore likely to be employed in government positions; while the Indo population became more entrepreneurial and were more represented in the private sector and enterprise. However, no major differences in earnings between Indo and Afro populations were reported at the time. Afro-Trinidadians have the lowest self- employmentrates in the country. This may be because they have higher denial rates for business loans, even when accounting for similar factors to other groups. This may hint at some level of discrimination towards Afro-Trinidadians in financial markets. It may also be a result from historical factors, differences in inheritance and cultural/ family differences.

Relatively recent stories in the media have only served to fuel these perceptions. The former Prime Minister, Kamla Persad Bissessar, publicly apologisedafter being accused of appointing a junior civil servant to a director position, suggesting patronage ahead of merit. Allegations have not been limited to the public sector, but have also been madein the private sector. These perceptions enter formal channels. A studyusing data from the Equal Opportunities Commission between 2008 and 2013 notes that race/ethnicity was the largest named reason for raising a complaint of workplace discrimination to the Commission.

Addressing the issue

On a more positive note, a 2018 studyargues that racial differences in employment outcomes is relatively low (seven percent on the Karmel-Maclachlan index) and have generally improved over the 1999 to 2015 period. The authors suggestthat when race-based differences exists in labour market outcomes, it is often a result of prior educational differences. These findings indicate some positive change, but also point to the complexities inherent in changing institutions – those interactions and practices deep-rooted in history.

First, perceptions matter. And information is important in shaping perceptions. The 2018 study suggests that labour market outcomes by race may not be as large as perceived. Yet, perceptions held are different. And perceptions matter for racial cohesion. One way of shifting perceptions is through information. The Trinidad and Tobago Central Statistical Office (CSO) monitors and reports on labour market data on a quarterly basis. Data is publicly availableby sex, age, educational attainment, type of worker, occupation group, and industry. This data is easy to download and analyse. However, one important variable is absent from the publicly available data – racial/ethnic background. It begs the question, should such data be publicly available given such high public interest in the issue? Arguably, routine monitoring of differences, if/where they exist, is the first step in correcting imbalances.

Second, if it is indeed the case that differences in labour market outcomes by racial groups result from differences in education outcomes, this warrants its own area of enquiry. If some racial/ethnic groups perform better than others, what drives these differences in the Trinidad and Tobago context? And, subsequently, how can policy tackle these issues? Would addressing educational differences highlight other disparities along racial lines?

The first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and reputed historian, Dr Eric Williams, famously remarked and used the slogan ‘Massa Day Done’ – the day of the colonial masters is finished. This sentiment informedmuch of the ideology in independent Trinidad and Tobago, and many other Caribbean islands. Indeed, countries like Trinidad and Tobago are free to choose their path and shape their destiny. It remains that breaking the chains of some colonial legacies, like race relations, is an ever-present challenge.

The scoping research undertaken for this blog was funded by the Warwick Interdisciplinary Centre for International Development (WICID). The authors thank WICID for this generous support.

Authors Bio:

Jamelia Harrisis a Research Economist at Fiscus and Visiting Research Fellow at the Politics and International Studies Department, University of Warwick. Her research spans a range of topics and includes foreign aid and the labour market, political patronage, and government finances.

Gianluc Robinsonis an MPhil Candidate at the University of Trinidad and Tobago. His research is mainly in environmental and marine sciences, though he has an interest in social sciences and data analytics.


August 17, 2022

The KazAID Story

The KazAID Story

Written by: Prachi Agarwal

The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine has captured the world’s attention. Conversations focusing on the fragility of countries’ sovereignty and security are growing, especially among former soviet republics. Despite threats to sovereignty and security, Kazakhstan, the largest country in central Asia and a former member of the USSR, aspires to be a global superpower. However, the primary challenge to this aspiration lies in ‘promoting increased connectivity while maintaining a freedom of action’. The solution to this challenge may require using foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy.

Thus, the primary aim of this blog is to describe and highlight pertinent issues for Kazakhstan’s foreign aid practices in the context of using foreign aid. The rationale behind such an endeavour is that KazAID (Kazakhstan’s foreign aid body) remains an under-researched area. KazAID’s establishment was driven by fulfilling Kazakhstan’s security needs and economic aspirations. While the role of foreign aid as a foreign policy instrument of the rich countries may be widely known, KazAID’s story shows that other developing nations could also challenge the existing western hegemony through strategic aid foreign practices.

Contextualising Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has been carefully trying to maintain relations with its largest trading partners - Russia, the United States and China. Kazakhstan believes that Eurasian connectivity could benefit its economic and security interests. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan maintains close ties with Russia and China. Earlier in 2022, when protests broke out against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan sought assistance from Russia to quell the growing protests. These protests were guided by the fear that Kazakhstan, too, may be invaded by Russia. These fears are not misguided as being a member of Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) is getting increasingly costly for Kazakhstan. Critics suggest that while the EaEU mimics the EU’s institutional framework, in practice it is an agency for Russia’s geopolitical interests. Being a member of the EaEU constrains Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and weakens its economy and it may want to leave the EaEu, thus inviting Putin’s wrath. China, too, pursues economic interests in Kazakhstan as its largest trading partner and an emerging source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Such close ties with China and Russia may invite sanctions from the West. Therefore, Kazakhstan maintains a multivectoral foreign policy and foreign aid is a crucial, yet overlooked, aspect Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.

From Aid Recipient to Aid Donor

Kazakhstan delivers foreign aid through its agency, KazAID. However, Kazakhstan used to be a prominent aid recipient rather than a donor. Previously, Kazakhstan received aid under the OECD’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) banner. Figure 1 captures the trends in aid receipt amongst the Central Asian countries to show that until 2007, Kazakhstan received aid in the same proportion as most countries in the region, but post 2007, the amount of aid received drastically decreased. Simultaneously, the demand for aid among other countries in the region (barring Turkmenistan) continued to increase.

new kaz aid image

Figure 1: Trends in Aid Receipts (Source: Author’s Own; Data: QWIDS)

Some argue that this pivot may be due to the oil industry. In figure 1, the increasing trend (till 2007) occurred as Kazakhstan (and other Central Asian countries) needed assistance in transitioning to a market-based economy post their disintegration from the USSR. Simultaneously, due to its export policies for Uranium, wheat, and other natural resources, Kazakhstan experienced massive increases in its GDP.

In 1999, former President Nazarbayev had announced the intentions to reduce aid dependency. Following this decision, Kazakhstan took measured steps in reducing its loans and grants. Due to the increases in national income, the World Bank, in 2006, categorised Kazakhstan as an upper-middle-income country. Subsequently, in line with its foreign policy, Kazakhstan aspired to be included in the elite Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Becoming a donor nation was critical in achieving this aspiration. In 2014, the government implemented the ODA Law which established the tasks, agendas, regulations and organisational matters for the same. This law served as the legal basis for establishing Kaz AID

What is KazAID?

KazAID was established through a presidential decree, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan. It was founded with the aim of building regional cooperation, helping Kazakhstan integrate into regional systems, connecting Europe and Asia, and promoting peace and security in the region. Thus far, major chunks of its aid have been delivered to countries in the region, but KazAID intends to extend aid to Latin American and African countries, too.

With a unilateral aid of USD 2 million, Afghanistan has been KazAID’s largest aid recipient so far. KazAID also supplies aid to Tajikistan. Although Tajikistan didn’t list Kazakhstan as a ‘foreign donor’ in one of its reports, KazAID continued with its initiatives in the region to build ‘brotherly relations’. Such activities resulted in an invitation from the OECD for a conference in Paris in 2018. Subsequently, Kazakhstan’s international image improved considerably, even perhaps establishing Kazakhstan as a regional leader. However, countries in the region are still reluctant to accept this status.

Figure 2 shows the amount of developmental assistance provided as a share of Kazakhstan’s Gross National Income (GNI) to indicate that initially, the aid amounts increased exponentially and then stabilised as it received the OECD Paris Conference invite. This further alludes to Kazakhstan’s strategy of employing foreign aid to aid its own agendas.

image 2 Kazak aid blog

Figure 2: Developmental Assistance provided as a share of GNI (Source: OECD, 2020)

At a conference, the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed that KazAID is an essential tool for the region’s long-term growth and development which would ensure peace and stability in the region. Indeed, this would directly benefit Kazakhstan’s own security and economic interests, which highlights the importance of foreign aid in Kazakhstan’s multivectoral foreign policy.

Situating KazAID in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy & Identity as a Donor

Given Kazakhstan’s proximity, history and economic ties with Russia, Kazakhstan could have invited sanctions from the United States or the NATO countries. However, to avoid this, Kazakhstan has employed its aid agency to partner with the US, the UN and other important nations/ organisations. Through KazAID initiatives and ODA policies, Kazakhstan’s donor identity was built which reaffirmed its authority in the region. But, in doing so, Kazakhstan has contrasted itself against other emerging donors.

Kazakhstan uses a ‘hybrid identity’ as a donor to combine aspects of being a traditional and an emerging donor. Historically, Kazakhstan has always maintained partnership, self-reliance and non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. This is significantly different from the practices of traditional aid agencies, such as USAID. Yet, the motivations of establishing an aid agency and practices match that of the traditional aid agencies, contrasting it from other emerging donors.

For a landlocked and transcontinental country, like Kazakhstan, the development of foreign policy is crucial. However, to effectively employ the landlocked location, Kazakhstan must diversify its foreign policy approaches to develop its foreign aid practices. To this end, Kazakhstan strategically engages in foreign aid practices to cushion itself from hostile nations while ensuring a dominant role in the region. Thereby presenting itself as a viable ally to Russia rather than a threat, despite maintaining relations with the US.

Author bio:

Prachi Agarwal is an independent researcher and development sector professional, based out of India. Her academic interests include, among others, understanding foreign aid in relation to power and hegemony in a global setting.


July 13, 2022

Reconfiguration of the natural gas production network in Europe

natural gas blog

Source: Mike Benna (Unsplash image)

Reconfiguration of the natural gas production network in Europe

Written by: Kerem Öge

Europe is one of the key theatres of global natural gas trade. Despite the European Union’s (EU) commitment to transitioning away from hydrocarbons, natural gas still plays a key role in supplying and sustaining crucial energy demand for the continent. The trade in natural gas has enjoyed continuous growth over the last two decades (except a minor dip immediately after the 2008 financial crisis) until the Covid-19 pandemic hit the global economy in early 2020.

The macroeconomic shock induced by the pandemic has had a major impact on natural gas markets. Throughout the world, the demand for natural gas has declined due to lockdown measures and slowing down of economic activity. However, the demand for gas along with other energy sources surged in 2021 in response to the global economic recovery. High demand combined with various supply shortages around the world meant that the energy prices has once again soared in this period. Finally, in 2022, the price of energy including natural gas has skyrocketed due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The dramatic fluctuations in energy markets in the last three years facilitated significant debate about the future of natural gas in Europe. While many call for an immediate transition to renewables, unfortunately this is not realistic. In fact, what we are currently experiencing is not the end of natural gas in Europe, but a major reconfiguration of the natural gas production network. Specifically, there are four seismic changes that will transform the post-Cold War status quo in which Russian gas has steadily supplied European gas markets.

The first change is the phasing out of fossil fuels. As European countries refine their plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in response to the ongoing climate crisis, natural gas will eventually decline in strategic importance. However, the road to achieve zero emissions is long and winding, and natural gas plays a pivotal part in the process as a relatively ‘clean’ fossil fuel. Accordingly, while coal plants are being phased out in many European countries, the EU’s gas consumption is expected to remain relatively high in the next two decades, and almost 90 percent of this gas will be supplied by external sources.

The second change is the increasing availability of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) thanks to the ‘shale revolution’ that originated in the United States. LNG provides a flexible alternative to long-term supply contracts that guarantee a certain amount of natural gas delivered by pipelines. In the next few decades, the increasing availability of LNG from Qatar and the United States may in fact facilitate the emergence of a global gas market. This would obviously have huge implications for many Eastern European countries who are currently completely dependent on Russian gas.

The third major change is a geopolitical one, which is often referred to as ‘pipeline politics’. In the post-1991 period, Russia has been a relatively stable supplier of natural gas to Europe via pre-existing pipelines that go across Ukraine and Belarus. In the last decade, numerous political and economic conflicts with these transit countries have motivated Russia to seek alternative routes such as Nordstream 1 and 2, South Stream, and Turkstream. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan also emerged as a modest, but reliable natural gas provider to Europe via Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline. Recent completion of some of these projects has seriously undermined Ukraine and promoted the emergence of Turkey as a new transit actor in European energy security.

The fourth and final change is associated with war and conflict in Eastern Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted a severe political and economic response by the EU against Moscow. Specifically, the Nord Stream II project was shelved by Germany and the EU is currently proposing plans to phase out Russian gas by 2027. Needless to say, these developments have the potential to fundamentally transform EU-Russia relations and would have major implications for the other three processes described above.

At the moment, it is difficult to imagine how the new natural gas production network in Europe will precisely look. However, one can make certain predictions based on the four transformations described above. It is clear that LNG will be the winner in the short-term as a flexible substitute to Russian gas. Consequently, natural gas pipelines are likely to become less important from a strategic perspective as more and more countries in Europe switch to LNG. Similarly, renewables, such as solar and wind energy, will increasingly become more viable options due to high prices. Finally, Azerbaijan, Qatar and the United States are likely to emerge as key energy providers for Europe, while Russian Gazprom will eventually target other markets, most likely in Asia.

Author Bio:

Kerem Öge is a Lecturer in Peace Studies and International Development at the University of Bradford. Previously, he has worked as a lecturer at King’s College London, Aston University, University of Nottingham, and the University of Wales Trinity Saint David. Kerem studied at the Middle East Technical University for a BSc in International Relations and a Minor degree in International Economics. He has an MA in International Political Economy from the University of Warwick, and he received his PhD in Political Science from Boston College, Massachusetts in 2013. He has held postdoctoral positions at Université Laval and McGill University.


About WICID

The Warwick Interdisciplinary Research Centre for International Development addresses urgent problems of inequality and social, political and economic change on a global level.

WICID Website

Editorial team

Dr. Briony Jones
Dr Mouzayian Khalil-Babatunde


If you wish to contribute to the blog, please contact think.development@warwick.ac.uk We are always looking for articles, essays, photos and videos dealing with different aspects of international development.

Twitter feed

Search this blog

Blog archive

Loading…

May 2024

Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su
Apr |  Today  |
      1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31      
Not signed in
Sign in

Powered by BlogBuilder
© MMXXIV