Nigeria’s New Petroleum Industry Act Could Entrench Injustices in Oil host Communities

Shell Oil’s oil and gas terminal on Bonny Island in southern Nigeria’s Niger Delta (Photo by Pius Utomi EKPEI / AFP)

Written By: Dr Phillip Nelson and Dr Modesta Tochi Alozie (Research Fellows, University of Warwick)

After nearly two decades of legal limbo, the Nigerian government has finally signed the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) into law. In Nigeria, the petroleum sector contributes significantly to the country’s economic growth and development. There are laws empowering the federal government to control and distribute the revenues generated from oil extraction. Many people in the Niger delta, the region where Nigeria’s oil exploration takes place, believe that the current fiscal framework guiding the distribution of oil revenues does not favour them. Concerns over the environmental harms of oil exploration also run deep within the Niger delta. The oil communities have been protesting against these legal frameworks and environmental harm, with many calling for resource and pollution control. Many commentators agree on the need for transformative reforms in the oil sector. The PIA, among other things, aims to address some of the grievances within the oil host communities.

The PIA aims to improve the governance of the Nigerian oil industry by ensuring accountability and transparency, while repositioning Nigeria for gas-based industrialisation as the world moves away from oil. The bill aims to address the massive lack of development in the Niger delta by requiring oil operators to contribute 3 per cent of their operating expenses toward a host community trust fund which is to be utilised for the socio-economic development of the Niger delta.

Yet, the PIA has not escaped criticism. It allocates 3 per cent of operating costs for community development, rather than the 10 per cent the local communities asked for. This minimal commitment has generated scepticisms about the willingness of the federal government to integrate local demands into oil policies and laws. However, what is less widely discussed, is the other ways in which the PIA risks entrenching existing injustices.

Chapter 3 section 257 (2) of the Host Community Section of the PIA states that:

“Where in any year, an act of vandalism, sabotage or other civil unrest occurs that causes damage to petroleum and designated facilities or disrupts production activities within the host communities, the community shall forfeit its entitlement to the extent of the costs of repairs of the damage that resulted from the activity with respect to the provisions of this Act within that financial year: Provided the interruption is not caused by technical or natural cause.”

This blog highlights three avenues through which this approach taken in the PIA may entrench injustices in oil host communities if it is not implemented carefully. First, this section prescribes collective punishment that can be ineffective and morally hazardous. Second, that it could constrain citizenship and activism, and finally that the process of establishing the causes of oil spills may be flawed.

1. Collective punishments are morally hazardous and can be ineffective.

When an entire community is forced to forfeit their entitlements for acts of vandalism, sabotage (pipeline vandalization) or unrest, they are being collectively punished for acts that may be caused by only a very small number, or even a single individual. Herein lies our first concern with the clause above: punishing innocent parties for the actions of others is unjustifiable. Collective punishments exacted during the course of conflict have been generally outlawed since the Hague Regulations of 1899. The Geneva conventions also prohibit collective punishments, and many individual states have specifically outlawed such punishments in their military regulations. In the case of Nigeria, if oil extraction were hampered by civil unrest, punishing the community rather than establishing individual responsibility would violate international conventions. Additionally, collective punishments can incentivise otherwise well-behaved, individuals to dissent – if you are going to be punished anyway, why not take part, or take what you can get from the situation? Furthermore, historically the Niger delta communities have had a very terrible relationship with the federal government and collective punishments could entrench community hatred towards the federal government.

2. Constrains on citizenship

The requirement that the oil communities forfeit their host community funds if civil unrest impacts oil production has significant implications for citizenship and activism. Historically in the Niger delta, protests and activism have been used to challenge unjust laws and policies as well as other harmful impacts of oil exploration, such as environmental degradation. However, the federal government has often repressed protests in the oil communities and described them as undermining peace and security even when they have been peaceful. Based on this history, we argue that this section could provide a window of opportunity for the federal government to characterise any act of local resistance to the oil industry as civil unrest. Concern that any protests, even when legitimate, could result in withholding host community funds can discourage all anti-government protests, effectively stripping citizens of their rights.

3. The process of establishing the cause of oil spills is deeply flawed

Finally, the above section of the PIA states that local communities will continue to receive host community funds only when interruption to oil production is caused by ‘technical or natural causes’. The issue here is that the process of establishing the cause of oil spills has been a key source of controversy in the Niger delta. When an oil spill occurs, a ‘Joint Investigation Visit’ (JIV) is carried out by representatives of the oil companies, regulatory agencies, and community representatives to establish the cause of the spill. While in theory, there are measures in place to ensure transparency and accountability within the JIV process, reports of corrupt practices, unreliability, undue influence of the oil companies, and complaints about the limited participation of the local communities are widely documented. In many cases, oil companies have used their undue influence to misattribute the cause of oil spills to sabotage which absolves them of paying compensation to the oil communities. On the other hand, local communities argue that while sabotage and vandalization is a big problem in the region, the JIV process greatly underreports the amount of oil spills caused by operational failure and corrosion. Since the process of establishing the cause of oil spills is flawed, the causality of oil spills is necessarily in doubt. We argue that this provision is likely to provide further incentive for the inaccuracies in the JIV process to continue since the cause of the oil spill will determine the allocation of development funds.

Taken together, while the PIA can provide a significant fillip to the governance of the petroleum sector, we see three main issues with Chapter 3, Section 257 (2) of the Host Community Section of the PIA. This Clause provides for collective punishment, which has specifically been outlawed in many circumstances, and it remains morally hazardous and ineffective. The Clause can also discourage host communities from engaging in peaceful protest, which is their civil right. And it can incentivise further inaccuracies within the JIV processes. With these concerns in mind, we recommend to the Federal Government of Nigeria to use needs assessments to fully explore the reasons why some individuals and groups object to the extraction by vandalising oil pipelines, and to consider using development funds to mitigate these. Lastly, we recommend, improving the legitimacy and integrity of the JIV process by making the process fair, transparent and increasing the meaningful participation of local communities. Without addressing these issues, the PIA will potentially leave the oil communities at the mercy of the powerful oil companies.

Author Bios

Dr Modesta Alozie is the Lead Research Fellow on the Data and Displacement Project at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Warwick, UK. She holds a PhD in Development Planning from University College London. Her research interests are in oil politics, climate change and digital humanitarianism.

Phillip Nelson is a postdoctoral researcher, most recently employed at the University of Warwick. He holds an MA in Economics and International Relations from the University of St Andrews and an MSocSci in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University, Sweden. He was awarded his PhD in international relations from the University of Essex in 2019 for his thesis on individual and group motivations for participation in civil conflict, and has so far published work in the journal of Defence and Peace Economics.

Mouzayian Khalil : 06 Apr 2022 15:19 |  Tags: Environmental Governance Niger Delta Petroleum Industry Act |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Is sustainable development possible in the current global political economy?

Source: Kristen Honig/USFS

Written By: Turhan Hizli

The consequences of climate change have become more obvious in recent decades, with global warming bringing many natural hazards, primarily sea level rises, wildfires etc. While we need to prevent its devastating impacts, can we mitigate climate change within the existing global political economy (GPE)? Can we accept that a significant reduction in emissions will inevitably require a change in our current consumption of goods and services? To sustain development without depleting our resources and damaging the environment encourages us to embrace a relatively new concept in the international development discipline- sustainable development, which according to the Brundtland Report, is a development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Report, 1987, p. 16). 

In the current era of global capitalism, some developed countries and global corporations disproportionately control key aspects of the GPE which is based on capitalism, globalisation, and free trade. GPE “deals with the interaction between political and economic forces. At its centre have always been questions of human welfare and how these might be related to state behaviour and corporate interests in different parts of the world” (Walzenbach, 2016, p. 1). It encapsulates predominantly capitalist institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, and since the 1990s capitalism’s ‘victory’ over socialism has led to wide-ranging support for the pro-market instruments ranging from deregulation, privatisation, and a limited state (Gilpin, 2001). A key question which currently faces us is whether sustainable development is possible within this incumbent GPE. This blog evaluates this question and concludes that sustainable development will necessitate substantial changes in the GPE and political institutions that bolster it.

Although developed countries are responsible for environmental degradation, as they consume 75 per cent of the world’s energy and contribute to 70 per cent of the ozone layer’s destruction, impact of climate change like rise in sea-level or habitat destruction threaten the livelihoods of most people in developing countries (Nixon, 2011). Developing countries in Southeast Asia are vulnerable to sea-level rise and subsequent floods whereas developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa suffer from droughts and crop failures (Ngcamu and Chan, 2020). There are also apparent inequalities in greenhouse gas emissions, for example, the US produces 20 per cent of emissions despite having 4 per cent of the world population (Roberts, 2019). Although the developed countries are responsible for triggering climate change, attempts by developing countries to stimulate development are criticised for causing global warming. For instance, their rural inhabitants are blamed for environmental degradation as they use industrialised fertilisers and pesticides even though Western chemical corporations promote their use (Banerjee, 2003). Also, slash-and-burn farmers in developing countries are held responsible for habitat destruction whereas timber corporations are inflicting the most damage (Banerjee, 2003). Furthermore, large corporations strive to spread scientific doubts to undermine efforts to tackle climate change. For instance, large corporations like ExxonMobil hires lobbyists, journalists and scientists who do not believe in climate change to justify inaction against climate change.  

Large corporations also seek to consolidate the business-as-usual approach through green capitalism which advocates the market’s role in reducing emissions and decreasing their waste (Berghoff and Rome, 2017). Although there have been minor improvements in pollution control and emissions decline, corporations’ prime aim is profit maximisation and there is still a long way to minimise emissions and monitor businesses compliance. More importantly, corporations put pressure on developing country governments to provide some concessions in economic policies (Banerjee, 2001). For instance, in Mexico, pressure from corporations persuaded the government to grow meat for Western fast-food companies on the land that was previously used by indigenous communities to grow corn (Banerjee, 2003). Another example is Brazil’s Carajás region- the centre for iron ore and timber production, in which the Brazilian government invested US$60 billion mainly funded by loans. While this project had a low economic gain, its costs were significant, it unsettled the Eastern Amazon’s native people and caused deforestation while easing developed countries’ access to imported raw materials (Carvalho, 2001).  

Furthermore, there are contradictions in international institutions’ efforts to achieve sustainable development like the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For instance, Goal 12, sustainable management and efficient resource, is incompatible with Goal 8; decent work and economic growth. Goal 12 is measured by material footprint and the consensus on yearly footprint is 50 billion tons, whereas the consensus on global economic growth in Goal 8annually is 3 per cent. This economic growth rate will increase material footprint from 87 billion tonnes (2015) to 167 billion tonnes (2030). However, reducing the material footprint to 50 billion tonnes would require six times increase in efficiency levels which is an unrealistic target. Also, Goal 13 advocates acting against climate change, and the Paris Agreement binds the SDGs to increases in average temperatures by a maximum of 2 degrees. However, with the business-as-usual approach in emission production, average temperatures are expected to rise by 4.2 degrees. To avoid global warming of more than 2 degrees, substantial decreases in CO2 emissions of around a yearly 4 per cent decline are needed. Assuming that the economic growth should be 3 per cent annually (Goal 8), and the reductions in emissions need to be 4 per cent, this would require 7.29 per cent decarbonisation annually, which means decarbonisation should happen six times faster than the historical levels which shows another contradiction between Goal 13 and Goal 8 (Hickel, 2019).

Decreasing emissions and resource consumption but also maintaining economic growth are difficult and not possible in the current GPE (Hickel, 2018).  Therefore, a considerable change in the GPE and democratic reforms in international institutions that would empower the Global South are essential. Furthermore, their debts should be cancelled, and they should receive financial assistance to achieve economic development. Developed countries should accept responsibility and implement de-growth strategies to achieve sustainable development. Deconstructing the current GPE is a bitter prescription, but the only way that humanity can survive.

Author’s Bio

Turhan Hizli is a final year Politics and International Studies student at the University of Warwick. His areas of interest include international development, geopolitics, de facto states and state-building, the politics of Cyprus and Turkey.

Mouzayian Khalil : 17 Mar 2022 17:00 |  Tags: Climate Change Global Political Economy Student Blog Sustainable Development |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Language is a Tool for Youth Exclusion in the Niger Delta

An illegal refinery in Rivers State, Nigeria.Pius Etomi Ekpei/AFP/Getty Images

Written By: Dr Modesta Alozie

Like many young people in the Niger delta region of Nigeria, Timi[1] felt great optimism about the future in 2009. This was the year the federal government announced the Presidential Amnesty Programme for young people in the violence-hit region in the southern region of the country. Youths who had been involved in the Niger delta violence were paid under this programme to drop their arms, with the additional promise of employment and regional development.

The violence erupted after years of the oil-producing communities complaining of developmental neglect and environmental degradation, while the Nigerian government and oil companies make profits from oil exploration.

The Niger delta is one of the most oil-rich regions in the world. Most of Nigeria’s wealth comes from the sale of the oil produced here. But despite this oil wealth, the Niger delta lacks real transformation. A clear indicator of this stunted development is the lack of good roads and reliable electricity in the region, including in its major cities.

Many youths in the Niger delta are also unemployed. And rising levels of pollution from recurrent oil spills is putting local livelihoods and health in further danger.

Then there is the big issue of oil revenue distribution. Many people in the delta believe that the national oil revenue distribution arrangement mostly benefits the ethnic majorities. This is because Nigeria distributes oil revenue according to population size. As such, regions with larger populations are allocated more resources.

As a result of these concerns, youths in the Niger delta began in 2003 to violently resist the oil industry, challenging their exclusion and demanding the development of their region.

Given this background, many have urged the government to create development agencies and programmes like the Presidential Amnesty Programme to integrate the region’s young people into the national development agenda.

My research finds, however, that the development agencies in the Niger delta are having limited success in including youths in the benefits of oil.

Language as a tool of exclusion

In this study, I interviewed 84 youths in the Niger delta. I also interviewed 19 development agency representatives from the Niger Delta Development Commission and the Presidential Amnesty Programme.

My findings show that institutional representatives use language to exclude young people from sharing in the benefits of oil.

I asked the youths to explain how they perceive their involvement in the Niger delta violence. I also asked institutional representatives to explain how they view youth violence. In analysing these interviews, I paid deep attention to the use of language.

Language and domination are intimately related. By using harmful language permitted by society, we can marginalise vulnerable groups, while enabling more powerful groups to maintain their power. Interestingly, those who bear the brunt of discriminatory language sometimes accept the negative language, and are complicit in their own oppression.

This phenomena is described by the French sociologist Bourdieu, as ‘symbolic violence.’ It’s a situation whereby dominant language accepted to be true by society is used to discriminate and exclude a group of people who accept but also resist that language.

There are three ways in which these dominant beliefs and ways of speaking about youths enable their exclusion while simultaneously allowing institutional representatives to maintain their power within the development agencies.

First, many institutional representatives believe that older people are wiser, and therefore more suitable for leadership. Young people on the other hand are often portrayed as lacking wisdom and leadership capabilities. In some instances, young people have come to internalise and accept this misconception.

However, some youths challenged this idea. One respondent pointed out that many past military heads of states in Nigeria led the country in their youth. They pointed to the example of Nigeria’s current president, Muhammadu Buhari, who first ruled Nigeria under the military government at the age of 41.

Still, this language used to describe young people deterred them from occupying leadership positions within the development agencies. As a result, more older people occupy higher positions of power within the agencies.

Also, in most interviews, institutional representatives perceived youths as lazy and responsible for their own unemployment. For example, an institutional representative said:

If you give them a job they don’t want to work, they are just lazy.

Portraying young people as lazy distracts from other causes of unemployment in the region, including graft. This language of ‘laziness’ also effectively functions to constrain the accountability of development agencies for failing to create jobs and improve lives.

This negative language of laziness helps perpetuate the economic domination of older people because it presents them as hardworking people who are deserving of their wealth.

Finally, institutional representatives also perceived young people as criminals with destructive tendencies. This negative portrayal casts doubts on young people’s credibility, and it puts them at a disadvantage when contesting for public office. It also means that older people are recognised as morally superior and worthy of public service. Language like this clears the way for the older generation to continue to hold on to power and decision making, while excluding young people. One respondent’s comment serves as an example:

You may not understand what I am saying because you are young. There will be a problem in the communities, sometimes they bring it to us and we have to decide what to do. You have to know about the people, their history, even the culture … Young people, many of them don’t know the culture.

Language matters

These seemingly natural ways of speaking about Niger delta youths dictate who is valued and who participates in the decision-making processes within development agencies in the region.

This harmful use of language puts young people at a disadvantage because it assumes that the older elites are better than the youths. And it justifies the economic, political and social domination of the elites in the oil development process.

The study findings raise questions about whether distributive interventions alone can enable the equitable participation of youths in the oil development process.

Distributive agencies remain crucial channels for achieving a more equitable distribution of oil profits. But without confronting the cultural and social barriers that limit young people’s participation in the oil development agencies and programmes, young people like Timi will continue to be left behind.

Author Bio:

Dr Modesta Alozie is the Lead Research Fellow on the Data and Displacement Project at the Department of Politics and International Relations University of Warwick, UK. She also teaches the Politics of Globalisation at Warwick. She holds a PhD in Development Planning from University College London. Her research interests are in oil politics, climate change and digital humanitarianism.

Mouzayian Khalil : 17 Feb 2022 14:29 |  Tags: Language Narratives Of Violence Niger Delta Oil Exploitation Youth Exclusion |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Using specific–purpose grants to achieve development goals

Photo credit: Jens Buurgaard Nielsen (creative commons)

Written by Jamelia Harris

How can specific-purpose grants be designed to better achieve development goals? This blog sets out important design considerations and argues that a delicate balance between grant conditions and preserving the autonomy of sub-national governments must be achieved to enable accountable service delivery.

Decentralisation has been increasing in developing countries, oftentimes, with the encouragement of development partners. It is estimated that intergovernmental transfers account for about 60 per cent of total local government revenues in developing countries. Given this trend, the question of the relative share of conditional/specific-purpose grants versus unconditional general grants becomes important.

There is growing evidence that large increases in grants, without adequately taking account of the incentives/disincentives created, have the potential to create unforeseen problems in terms of local government performance and longer-term sustainability. Given this, many have advocated for specific-purpose or conditional grants as they have the potential to enhance fiscal equalisation at the sub-national level, improve economic efficiency, and promote greater accountability and service delivery. Empirically, conditional grants dwarf unconditional ones in countries like Uganda and Tanzania.

How should such specific purpose grants then be designed? This is precisely the type of question that concerns countries like Ethiopia as it reviews its specific purpose grants.

A team of researchers and development consultants from Fiscus has been involved in investigating the answers to this question as part of a technical assistance programme to the Government of Ethiopia. As part of the process, a comprehensive review of conditional grants in Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and India was undertaken. From this, four key lessons emerge that should guide developing countries in designing specific purpose grants.

1. Clear conditions must be set for conditional transfers

There should be clear agreement between central and sub-national governments on conditions of the grant. In Kenya, this includes input-based conditions such as a specified expenditure type, output-based conditions such as achieving a set level of service delivery under a performance-based system, and/or a grant-matching requirement where the sub-national government agrees to contribute an agreed percentage. In Rwanda, specific-purpose grants target set sub-accounts, and performance contracts or imihigo are agreed with district-level mayors. India requires states to commit a matching grant, which varies based on regional development. Uganda uses a performance-based financing approach. South Africa legislates conditional grants under the annually updated Division of Revenue Act. The Act requires all grant programmes to publish a clear framework setting out rules for allocation and use, measurable objectives, disbursement schedules, reporting requirements and records of past performance. In all five countries, conditions have been credited with improving services delivery.

2. Robust monitoring systems need to be established

Given that clear conditions are agreed, a robust monitoring system is required where results can be documented and tracked. Although Kenya has a strong framework for setting conditions, documenting results is one of the weaknesses of the system. This means that service delivery gains and progress toward development outcomes could be even higher. In contrast, Rwanda has drawn on the traditional imihigo system to enhance accountability. Imigiho targets are linked to performance metrics and scores. Monitoring systems have improved significantly in South Africa. Here, monthly and quarterly sub-national government reports on revenue, expenditures and non-financial performance are submitted to relevant sector departments and the National Treasury, who in turn submit quarterly reports to Parliament. A strong monitoring system improves intergovernmental accountability and service delivery at the sub-national level.

3. Sub-national capacity should be considered

An assumption underlying decentralisation is that sub-national governments can deliver once they have access to finances. Evidence from India and South Africa suggest that regional-level implementation capacity can often constrain service delivery. This implies that effort must be placed on strengthening local capacity when intergovernmental transfer systems are being reformed. This may be done through a conditional grant similar to the Capacity-Building Grant in South Africa, which aims to develop management, planning, technical and budgeting skills in municipalities.

4. A balance with regional autonomy is needed

Some have argued that earmarked transfers, if excessively used, can limit regional spending autonomy. For instance, 80 per cent of transfers to districts in Rwanda are earmarked for precise activities, with only 20 per cent left for discretionary spending. Conditional transfers should therefore be cognisant of the larger decentralisation agenda, which often aims to give more power to subnational governments. For example, if regions are responsible for education spending, an earmarked grant can complement this by focusing on the poorest schools or poorest children. In so doing, the fiscal autonomy of the regions is preserved, but pro-poor spending is enhanced.

In sum, specific-purpose grants have significant potential to enhance service delivery and achieve development goals. To maximise benefits, these instruments should have set conditions and robust mentoring frameworks, which are cognisant of local capabilities and respectful of subnational autonomy.

Jamelia Harris is a Research Economist at Fiscus and Visiting Research Fellow at the Politics and International Studies Department, University of Warwick. Her research spans a range of topics and includes foreign aid and the labour market, political patronage, and government finances.

Mouzayian Khalil : 26 Jan 2022 14:47 |  Tags: Development Goals International Development Specific-Purpose Grants |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Using specific–purpose grants to achieve development goals

Photo credit: Jens Buurgaard Nielsen (creative commons)

Written by Jamelia Harris

How can specific-purpose grants be designed to better achieve development goals? This blog sets out important design considerations and argues that a delicate balance between grant conditions and preserving the autonomy of sub-national governments must be achieved to enable accountable service delivery.

Decentralisation has been increasing in developing countries, oftentimes, with the encouragement of development partners. It is estimated that intergovernmental transfers account for about 60 per cent of total local government revenues in developing countries. Given this trend, the question of the relative share of conditional/specific-purpose grants versus unconditional general grants becomes important.

There is growing evidence that large increases in grants, without adequately taking account of the incentives/disincentives created, have the potential to create unforeseen problems in terms of local government performance and longer-term sustainability. Given this, many have advocated for specific-purpose or conditional grants as they have the potential to enhance fiscal equalisation at the sub-national level, improve economic efficiency, and promote greater accountability and service delivery. Empirically, conditional grants dwarf unconditional ones in countries like Uganda and Tanzania.

How should such specific purpose grants then be designed? This is precisely the type of question that concerns countries like Ethiopia as it reviews its specific purpose grants.

A team of researchers and development consultants from Fiscus has been involved in investigating the answers to this question as part of a technical assistance programme to the Government of Ethiopia. As part of the process, a comprehensive review of conditional grants in Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and India was undertaken. From this, four key lessons emerge that should guide developing countries in designing specific purpose grants.

1. Clear conditions must be set for conditional transfers

There should be clear agreement between central and sub-national governments on conditions of the grant. In Kenya, this includes input-based conditions such as a specified expenditure type, output-based conditions such as achieving a set level of service delivery under a performance-based system, and/or a grant-matching requirement where the sub-national government agrees to contribute an agreed percentage. In Rwanda, specific-purpose grants target set sub-accounts, and performance contracts or imihigo are agreed with district-level mayors. India requires states to commit a matching grant, which varies based on regional development. Uganda uses a performance-based financing approach. South Africa legislates conditional grants under the annually updated Division of Revenue Act. The Act requires all grant programmes to publish a clear framework setting out rules for allocation and use, measurable objectives, disbursement schedules, reporting requirements and records of past performance. In all five countries, conditions have been credited with improving services delivery.

2. Robust monitoring systems need to be established

Given that clear conditions are agreed, a robust monitoring system is required where results can be documented and tracked. Although Kenya has a strong framework for setting conditions, documenting results is one of the weaknesses of the system. This means that service delivery gains and progress toward development outcomes could be even higher. In contrast, Rwanda has drawn on the traditional imihigo system to enhance accountability. Imigiho targets are linked to performance metrics and scores. Monitoring systems have improved significantly in South Africa. Here, monthly and quarterly sub-national government reports on revenue, expenditures and non-financial performance are submitted to relevant sector departments and the National Treasury, who in turn submit quarterly reports to Parliament. A strong monitoring system improves intergovernmental accountability and service delivery at the sub-national level.

3. Sub-national capacity should be considered

An assumption underlying decentralisation is that sub-national governments can deliver once they have access to finances. Evidence from India and South Africa suggest that regional-level implementation capacity can often constrain service delivery. This implies that effort must be placed on strengthening local capacity when intergovernmental transfer systems are being reformed. This may be done through a conditional grant similar to the Capacity-Building Grant in South Africa, which aims to develop management, planning, technical and budgeting skills in municipalities.

4. A balance with regional autonomy is needed

Some have argued that earmarked transfers, if excessively used, can limit regional spending autonomy. For instance, 80 per cent of transfers to districts in Rwanda are earmarked for precise activities, with only 20 per cent left for discretionary spending. Conditional transfers should therefore be cognisant of the larger decentralisation agenda, which often aims to give more power to subnational governments. For example, if regions are responsible for education spending, an earmarked grant can complement this by focusing on the poorest schools or poorest children. In so doing, the fiscal autonomy of the regions is preserved, but pro-poor spending is enhanced.

In sum, specific-purpose grants have significant potential to enhance service delivery and achieve development goals. To maximise benefits, these instruments should have set conditions and robust mentoring frameworks, which are cognisant of local capabilities and respectful of subnational autonomy.

Jamelia Harris is a Research Economist at Fiscus and Visiting Research Fellow at the Politics and International Studies Department, University of Warwick. Her research spans a range of topics and includes foreign aid and the labour market, political patronage, and government finances.

Mouzayian Khalil : 26 Jan 2022 14:47 |  Tags: Development Goals International Development Specific-Purpose Grants |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Using specific–purpose grants to achieve development goals

Photo credit: Jens Buurgaard Nielsen (creative commons)

Written by Jamelia Harris

How can specific-purpose grants be designed to better achieve development goals? This blog sets out important design considerations and argues that a delicate balance between grant conditions and preserving the autonomy of sub-national governments must be achieved to enable accountable service delivery.

Decentralisation has been increasing in developing countries, oftentimes, with the encouragement of development partners. It is estimated that intergovernmental transfers account for about 60 per cent of total local government revenues in developing countries. Given this trend, the question of the relative share of conditional/specific-purpose grants versus unconditional general grants becomes important.

There is growing evidence that large increases in grants, without adequately taking account of the incentives/disincentives created, have the potential to create unforeseen problems in terms of local government performance and longer-term sustainability. Given this, many have advocated for specific-purpose or conditional grants as they have the potential to enhance fiscal equalisation at the sub-national level, improve economic efficiency, and promote greater accountability and service delivery. Empirically, conditional grants dwarf unconditional ones in countries like Uganda and Tanzania.

How should such specific purpose grants then be designed? This is precisely the type of question that concerns countries like Ethiopia as it reviews its specific purpose grants.

A team of researchers and development consultants from Fiscus has been involved in investigating the answers to this question as part of a technical assistance programme to the Government of Ethiopia. As part of the process, a comprehensive review of conditional grants in Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and India was undertaken. From this, four key lessons emerge that should guide developing countries in designing specific purpose grants.

1. Clear conditions must be set for conditional transfers

There should be clear agreement between central and sub-national governments on conditions of the grant. In Kenya, this includes input-based conditions such as a specified expenditure type, output-based conditions such as achieving a set level of service delivery under a performance-based system, and/or a grant-matching requirement where the sub-national government agrees to contribute an agreed percentage. In Rwanda, specific-purpose grants target set sub-accounts, and performance contracts or imihigo are agreed with district-level mayors. India requires states to commit a matching grant, which varies based on regional development. Uganda uses a performance-based financing approach. South Africa legislates conditional grants under the annually updated Division of Revenue Act. The Act requires all grant programmes to publish a clear framework setting out rules for allocation and use, measurable objectives, disbursement schedules, reporting requirements and records of past performance. In all five countries, conditions have been credited with improving services delivery.

2. Robust monitoring systems need to be established

Given that clear conditions are agreed, a robust monitoring system is required where results can be documented and tracked. Although Kenya has a strong framework for setting conditions, documenting results is one of the weaknesses of the system. This means that service delivery gains and progress toward development outcomes could be even higher. In contrast, Rwanda has drawn on the traditional imihigo system to enhance accountability. Imigiho targets are linked to performance metrics and scores. Monitoring systems have improved significantly in South Africa. Here, monthly and quarterly sub-national government reports on revenue, expenditures and non-financial performance are submitted to relevant sector departments and the National Treasury, who in turn submit quarterly reports to Parliament. A strong monitoring system improves intergovernmental accountability and service delivery at the sub-national level.

3. Sub-national capacity should be considered

An assumption underlying decentralisation is that sub-national governments can deliver once they have access to finances. Evidence from India and South Africa suggest that regional-level implementation capacity can often constrain service delivery. This implies that effort must be placed on strengthening local capacity when intergovernmental transfer systems are being reformed. This may be done through a conditional grant similar to the Capacity-Building Grant in South Africa, which aims to develop management, planning, technical and budgeting skills in municipalities.

4. A balance with regional autonomy is needed

Some have argued that earmarked transfers, if excessively used, can limit regional spending autonomy. For instance, 80 per cent of transfers to districts in Rwanda are earmarked for precise activities, with only 20 per cent left for discretionary spending. Conditional transfers should therefore be cognisant of the larger decentralisation agenda, which often aims to give more power to subnational governments. For example, if regions are responsible for education spending, an earmarked grant can complement this by focusing on the poorest schools or poorest children. In so doing, the fiscal autonomy of the regions is preserved, but pro-poor spending is enhanced.

In sum, specific-purpose grants have significant potential to enhance service delivery and achieve development goals. To maximise benefits, these instruments should have set conditions and robust mentoring frameworks, which are cognisant of local capabilities and respectful of subnational autonomy.

Jamelia Harris is a Research Economist at Fiscus and Visiting Research Fellow at the Politics and International Studies Department, University of Warwick. Her research spans a range of topics and includes foreign aid and the labour market, political patronage, and government finances.

Mouzayian Khalil : 26 Jan 2022 14:47 |  Tags: Development Goals International Development Specific-Purpose Grants |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Using specific–purpose grants to achieve development goals

Photo credit: Jens Buurgaard Nielsen (creative commons)

Written by Jamelia Harris

How can specific-purpose grants be designed to better achieve development goals? This blog sets out important design considerations and argues that a delicate balance between grant conditions and preserving the autonomy of sub-national governments must be achieved to enable accountable service delivery.

Decentralisation has been increasing in developing countries, oftentimes, with the encouragement of development partners. It is estimated that intergovernmental transfers account for about 60 per cent of total local government revenues in developing countries. Given this trend, the question of the relative share of conditional/specific-purpose grants versus unconditional general grants becomes important.

There is growing evidence that large increases in grants, without adequately taking account of the incentives/disincentives created, have the potential to create unforeseen problems in terms of local government performance and longer-term sustainability. Given this, many have advocated for specific-purpose or conditional grants as they have the potential to enhance fiscal equalisation at the sub-national level, improve economic efficiency, and promote greater accountability and service delivery. Empirically, conditional grants dwarf unconditional ones in countries like Uganda and Tanzania.

How should such specific purpose grants then be designed? This is precisely the type of question that concerns countries like Ethiopia as it reviews its specific purpose grants.

A team of researchers and development consultants from Fiscus has been involved in investigating the answers to this question as part of a technical assistance programme to the Government of Ethiopia. As part of the process, a comprehensive review of conditional grants in Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and India was undertaken. From this, four key lessons emerge that should guide developing countries in designing specific purpose grants.

1. Clear conditions must be set for conditional transfers

There should be clear agreement between central and sub-national governments on conditions of the grant. In Kenya, this includes input-based conditions such as a specified expenditure type, output-based conditions such as achieving a set level of service delivery under a performance-based system, and/or a grant-matching requirement where the sub-national government agrees to contribute an agreed percentage. In Rwanda, specific-purpose grants target set sub-accounts, and performance contracts or imihigo are agreed with district-level mayors. India requires states to commit a matching grant, which varies based on regional development. Uganda uses a performance-based financing approach. South Africa legislates conditional grants under the annually updated Division of Revenue Act. The Act requires all grant programmes to publish a clear framework setting out rules for allocation and use, measurable objectives, disbursement schedules, reporting requirements and records of past performance. In all five countries, conditions have been credited with improving services delivery.

2. Robust monitoring systems need to be established

Given that clear conditions are agreed, a robust monitoring system is required where results can be documented and tracked. Although Kenya has a strong framework for setting conditions, documenting results is one of the weaknesses of the system. This means that service delivery gains and progress toward development outcomes could be even higher. In contrast, Rwanda has drawn on the traditional imihigo system to enhance accountability. Imigiho targets are linked to performance metrics and scores. Monitoring systems have improved significantly in South Africa. Here, monthly and quarterly sub-national government reports on revenue, expenditures and non-financial performance are submitted to relevant sector departments and the National Treasury, who in turn submit quarterly reports to Parliament. A strong monitoring system improves intergovernmental accountability and service delivery at the sub-national level.

3. Sub-national capacity should be considered

An assumption underlying decentralisation is that sub-national governments can deliver once they have access to finances. Evidence from India and South Africa suggest that regional-level implementation capacity can often constrain service delivery. This implies that effort must be placed on strengthening local capacity when intergovernmental transfer systems are being reformed. This may be done through a conditional grant similar to the Capacity-Building Grant in South Africa, which aims to develop management, planning, technical and budgeting skills in municipalities.

4. A balance with regional autonomy is needed

Some have argued that earmarked transfers, if excessively used, can limit regional spending autonomy. For instance, 80 per cent of transfers to districts in Rwanda are earmarked for precise activities, with only 20 per cent left for discretionary spending. Conditional transfers should therefore be cognisant of the larger decentralisation agenda, which often aims to give more power to subnational governments. For example, if regions are responsible for education spending, an earmarked grant can complement this by focusing on the poorest schools or poorest children. In so doing, the fiscal autonomy of the regions is preserved, but pro-poor spending is enhanced.

In sum, specific-purpose grants have significant potential to enhance service delivery and achieve development goals. To maximise benefits, these instruments should have set conditions and robust mentoring frameworks, which are cognisant of local capabilities and respectful of subnational autonomy.

Jamelia Harris is a Research Economist at Fiscus and Visiting Research Fellow at the Politics and International Studies Department, University of Warwick. Her research spans a range of topics and includes foreign aid and the labour market, political patronage, and government finances.

Mouzayian Khalil : 26 Jan 2022 14:47 |  Tags: Development Goals International Development Specific-Purpose Grants |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Return migration: The making of ‘brain circulation’

Source: IOM, July 2021

Written by: Toli J. Amare (Blog Competition shortlist entry)

Migration has been one of the key dimensions of globalisation with ‘brain drain’ increasingly becoming a key feature, and one of the main benefits to the home country in the form of remittances and foreign currency. However, recently, owing to factors like local changes in the emerging nations, the flow of migrants has started to change from the developed world to the developing nations in different regions of the world including Eastern Europe, East Asian countries, and some African countries. For example, Ethiopia until recently has been the linchpin for its economic development and was able to attract a large number of returnees. Ethiopian returnees are playing a vital role in facilitating economic growth and technology transfer. According to a report by the United Nations Agency for International Migration, (2019) the last decade has seen an unprecedented increase in the number of return migrants across the globe. Following this, a long tradition of war for talent which most of the emerging nations are assumed to have lost is shifting because of the change in the dynamics of migration.

Two things might have contributed to the change in the wave of migration. Firstly, the immigration policies, regimes, and xenophobia in the host countries might have facilitated the relevance of returning home. For instance, the rise of Donald Trump had initiated a zero-tolerance immigration policy in the United States with lasting impacts. Second, local transformations in the home countries might have aroused migrants’ interests to contribute to their homeland. Emerging nations have an unexploited market, they hold huge business potential for returnee ventures. Returnees hold abundant skills, experiences, and networks that could be used in facilitating the home country’s economy (Saxenian, 2005). Recently, I interviewed around 30 Ethiopian returnees who are engaged in business for my PhD research project. A returnee from the US explained:

“Migration gives you a chance to see things you have never been aware of, and value what you tend to take for granted. It helps you develop a unique personality and identity. It teaches you respect for work, rules, time, and many skills useable after the return”.

Return migration has resulted in two major outcomes. First, it made it possible for talents to be shared and circulated. It has reoriented the labeling of migration from ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain gain’ by signifying migration as an opportunity and a beacon of hope in driving local economic development (Saxenian, 2005). Evidence from Asian countries shows that return migrants are transforming the socio-economic and political environment of their home countries (Gruenhagen, 2019; Gruenhagen and Davidsson 2018). Second, emerging nations who had been assumed losers in the global war for talent have started to fetch their fair share from migration, turning the lose-win tradition to triple wins i.e., the migrants, the host countries, and home countries. This assures a reconsideration of migration from a liability to an opportunity for emerging nations. In line with this, migration is now considered to be one of the pillar elements necessary to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals of 2030. However, it does not seem to be easy to maximise the benefits of migration in emerging economies.

The paradox of keeping the brain circulating

Despite varied accrued benefits from migrants living abroad, in some cases, policymakers in emerging economies seem to fix their focus mainly on remittances, and yet to recognise their post-return role. Particularly, African nations seem not to prepare well to take advantage of this phenomenon. For this reason, returnee migrants face two main challenges. The first one is the institutional gap (Gruenhagen, 2019). Often bureaucracy is a primal bottleneck in the emerging nations. Returnees who worked and/or studied in developed nations often expect a different institutional setup that can accommodate their needs. However, corruption and lengthy bureaucracy tend to hold returnees back. There are misconceptions about returning among the policymakers. For example, returnees are assumed to be people who seek to maximise their sole benefits without any regard to the homeland, an idea that drives returnees to frustrations. An excerpt from an interview with another Ethiopian returnee reinforces this:

“Despite the good system and lovely social life, the system in this country needs a huge work. People are assigned to positions based on blood relations, nothing about knowledge and capacity. They do not have respect for a person, they do not talk to you well, imagine how bad it is for the country. I hope it will be taking shape soon. Additionally, most of the officials are corrupt, they ask you [for] cash straight”.

The second is an interpersonal challenge (Mreji and Barnard, 2021). After working in the advanced liberal nations for years, returnees often find it difficult to reintegrate into the society they once left, making them feel alienated due to their absence. Returnees are often assumed to be people with enough cash to spend and support. Due to their better economic position, they are often considered to be responsible for their close ties. This adds to the grand challenge, finally hindering their contribution potential.

Therefore, given the potential of migrants in propelling the economy, and in light of the above challenges, regimes have to improve to take advantage of returnee migrants. Emerging nations need to revisit their policymaking to accommodate the growing interest of returnees. Apart from the remittances, migrants are potential entrepreneurs, carriers of foreign knowledge, and facilitators of innovation and technology transfer to revitalise and transform the local economy.

References

Gruenhagen, J. H., & Davidsson, P. (2018). Returnee entrepreneurs: Do they all boost emerging economies?. International Review of Entrepreneurship, 16(4).

Gruenhagen, J. H. (2019). Returnee entrepreneurs and the institutional environment: case study insights from China. International Journal of Emerging Markets.

Mreji, P., & Barnard, H. (2021). The micro-foundations of the returnee liability: The interpersonal challenges of returnee entrepreneurs in Kenya. Journal of International Management, 27(2), 100846.

Saxenian, A. (2021). Brain circulation and capitalist dynamics: Chinese chipmaking and the Silicon Valley-Hsinchu-Shanghai Triangle. In The economic sociology of capitalism(pp. 325-351). Princeton University Press.

Saxenian, A. (2005). From brain drain to brain circulation: Transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China. Studies in comparative international development, 40(2), 35-61.

Author Bio:

Toli J. Amare is a Doctoral Candidate in Management in the Department of Management, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. Occasionally, he visits Jonkoping International Business School in Sweden as part of a collaborative programme between Addis Ababa University and Jonkoping University in Sweden. His research interests are entrepreneurship and small business, strategy, and management practices. Currently, he is working on his dissertation entitled - Enablers and challenges of returnee Entrepreneurship in Ethiopia.

Mouzayian Khalil : 04 Jan 2022 01:14 |  Tags: Brain Circulation Brain Drain Ethiopia Migration Remittances Return Migration |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

The Global 'Syndemic’: A Tri–economic Burden of Undernutrition, Obesity and Climate Change

Photo byRiccardo Lennart Niels Mayer

Written by Sanya Srivastava (Winner of Think Development Blog 2021 Competition)

The Global "Syndemic"

Malnutrition and all its forms, inclusive of obesity, undernutrition, and other nutritional risks, is one of the foremost sources of global poor health. Currently, undernutrition and obesity each affect approximately 2 billion people globally. Undernutrition still exists widely but is one of the least addressed socioeconomic and health problems. The cost of obesity accounts for almost 3% of the world’s GDP, while unmitigated climate change may exceed 7% of the world’s GDP by 2100. Traditionally undernutrition, obesity, and climate change have generally been viewed as separate concerns, however in the near future as climate change challenges continue to worsen, the damage points include not only to the environment but also global health on which climate change has a direct effect. These three challenges are positively correlated, otherwise referred to as the “The Global Syndemic”, they persist in most countries throughout the world and share fundamental socio-economic drivers.

The interdependent implications and costs of the "syndemic"

Global climate change is anticipated to hinder food security as it will negatively affect crop yields, prices and nutritional composition of the crops.Global crop and economic models have projected a 1–29% cereal price increase in 2050 and a 3.7–6.5% decrease in protein and zinc composition in major crops, thus potentially increasing the risk of malnutrition. Historically, the most widespread form of malnutrition has been undernutrition but in the past 40 years, the obesity pandemic has shifted the patterns of malnutrition from high-income countries to worldwide (Popkin, B.M. et al.). Once considered a concern of high-income countries, the problem of being overweight and obesity is increasing in low-income and middle-income countries due to some being heavily dependent on imported food supplies. The major correlation between overeating and climate change is the excess greenhouse gas emissions (GHGEs) that come with an obesity-inducing/maintaining diet. The steep increase in children affected by obesity is largely led by emergent economies – in South East Asia, Middle East and Latin America (Popkin, B.M. et al.) and is a huge contributing factor for three of the four leading causes of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) worldwide.

Countries transitioning from low to high income status experience a higher prevalence of obesity and GHGEs due to rapid urbanisation, a shift in transportation structure and consequently lower physical activity and changes in dietary patterns. These are attributed to increased consumption of ultra-processed food which in turn is associated with high GHGEs. The tri-economic burden encompassing this syndemic is significant enough to impact the poorest strata of the population which is estimated to be 8.5 billion by 2030. The prevalent costs of undernutrition are approximately $3.5 trillion annually. Economic losses due to obesity amount to about $2 trillion annually from health-care costs and absent economic productivity. These costs represent 2.8% of the world’s GDP. The fiscal effects of climate change include the costs of environmental disasters, changes in habitat, health effects, industry stress primarily in agriculture and fisheries, and the costs of reducing GHGEs. Continued inaction towards curbing global climate change is predicted to cost around 5–10% of global GDP, whereas just 1% of the world’s GDP could arrest the increase in climate change. The paradoxical outcome of this syndemic is that the maximum suffering and economic damages which will be caused by climate change will be suffered by the world’s poorest households who ironically are insignificant contributors to GHGEs and additionally have the least capacity to align themselves with climate change.

The way forward: Dissolving the links within the "syndemic"

The causes of malnutrition are multifarious, which requires development of models that compute the prospective impacts of climate change on global health. There is urgent need for an approach that addresses the critical situation, the strong interconnection – the syndemic - and that calls for including climate change negotiations in matters of food and nutrition security. Nutrition and health professionals must grab a stake in key climate change adjustments and mitigation programmes, including science-based assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and policies and actions formulated by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). All in all, I believe going forward all stakeholders should contribute to the following:

Firstly, nutrition should be included in the action plans to curb climate change with an increased attention on those who are more susceptible to malnutrition, such as mothers and children. Nutrition security must unequivocally be integrated with climate-resilient development, national adaptation, and disaster risk reduction plans in low and middle-income countries. Here two approaches can work simultaneously: one approach can focus on scaling evidence-backed nutrition interventions, food aid, and creating safety nets. While the second approach can work on multisectoral convergences toward climate-adaptive agriculture, health, and social protection schemes.

Secondly, it is becoming increasingly necessary to include nutrition considerations in all climate change mitigation efforts. Mitigation strategies such as sustainable food production, sustainable diets, sustainable food consumption, and waste reduction, should be explored and encouraged. Such strategies will positively affect the following sectors: nutrition, health, and the environment. Moreover, evidence shows that a conservative approach to meat production and dietary meat consumption leads to better nutritional balance in both high and low-income populations.

Lastly, policy coherence between nutrition security, sustainable development and climate adaptation, and consequent risk mitigation should be explored. It is important to expand partnerships and communications among relevant stakeholders to develop experience and coordinated evidence-based policies that incorporate nutrition awareness in institutional and policy frameworks at all levels. Factors such as political will and good governance can influence the integration of nutrition-sensitive actions into sustainable development. Key state and private sector actors should place human rights at the centre of solutions to adapt and mitigate the severe impacts of climate change and create a conducive environment to discuss climate-resilient strategies for nutrition security, thereby curbing malnutrition and dissolving the syndemic bond.

Sanya Srivastava is an early career public policy professional with an undergraduate degree in Economics and Mathematics and is currently pursuing a Post Graduate Diploma in Development Studies. She is passionate about strengthening governance structures and solving sustainable developmental challenges. Her current research interests lie in understanding the intersection between economic development, social progress and commercial growth through evidence and experience-based policies.

Mouzayian Khalil : 15 Dec 2021 09:09 |  Tags: Global Climate Change Obesity Undernutrition |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem

Politics of Tourism: Identity and Commercialisation of Culture and Heritage

Angkor Wat. Alain Secretan (ASITRAC), National Geographic Group

Written By: Suramya Srivastava

Tourism has been one of the hardest hit industriesdue to the global coronavirus pandemic, with an estimated loss of USD 2.4 trillion in 2020 alone. For many developing countries, tourism is a key sector that contributes significantly to their economic growth and development, providing revenue and employment alike. Due to the interlinked nature of all human activities and the different spheres within which they exist and interact - social (encompassing religion, culture, etc.), economic, and political - it is easy to see how tourism fits into the political sphere. It can be used as a political instrument by politicians and the state to gain specific benefits or influence opinions and behaviours, both at local and international levels. The East and Southeast Asian region is a rich case study for an understanding of the political nature of tourism. This blog will specifically delve into examining how developing nations within this region market their unique culture and heritage to draw in tourists. This links tourism to foreign policy, through which any kind of action (or inaction) from the government with regard to tourist activity can be analysed within the arena of policy-making.

When looking at a country’s culture and heritage, or its entertainment industry, tourism based on these aspects provides a means to develop soft power and influence. This is certainly the case in the three main Northeast Asian countries - Japan, South Korea, and China. Each of these three countries have used their entertainment industries and media to encourage tourism. Perhaps the most successful of the three is South Korea, with its hallyuwave (the term given to its substantial cultural capital and soft power associated with its entertainment industry), which drew in hundreds of thousands of visitors before the outbreak of Covid-19. However, Japan also has a long history of promoting tourism to showcase its uniqueness and cultural attractiveness. Additionally, the rewards from tourism—increased revenues and profits, boosting economic and political leverage—accrue not just for the receiving country, but also for the origin country, as seen with China, which has the largest growing outbound tourist market with an ever-increasing middle class eager to spend its money.

Outside of the entertainment industry, countries also commercialise and commodify their culture and heritage in order to attract tourists. This can be in tandem with promoting the entertainment industry or beyond it, extended to gaming and sporting events as well, all of which come under the umbrella of building a national image. Here, Linda Richterdraws on the example of the Olympics. Few of the Olympics games have ever broken even in economic terms, but their value lies in the demonstration of the host country’s strengths and achievements, building a national identity that the country can present at an international scale. The gaze of the tourist here is also important for the state’s presentation of itself and its cultural authority. This then forms a self-sustaining feedback loop of sorts, as the tourist’s gaze helps strengthen the national image, but it is also the tourism industry, working in collaboration with the state, that shapes and forms how the tourist’s gaze functions and what it perceives.

Accumulation of cultural capital and accompanying soft power can also be developed by focusing on existing cultural architectures and monuments.One example is Cambodia, which has used its own history, memorialised in museums and heritage sites, to draw in visitors. These heritage sites, like the Angkor Wat, have become national symbols. A particularly interesting aspect is that Cambodia’s commercialisation and memorialisation of its history occurred in the years immediately after the Khmer Rouge genocide, that occurred from 1970-75. The then Vietnamese-assisted Cambodian state, known as People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was not recognised internationally as a legitimate and sovereign state. It thus turned to tourism to simultaneously establish its identity and draw in aid to help its development and recovery. The PRK granted visas for travel specifically to experts helping with reconstruction, journalists, aid workers, and representatives of sympathetic states and organisations, and during their trips, included a necessary visit to the Tuol Sleng Museum (infamously dubbed the ‘killing fields’) that documented the crimes committed by Pol Pot and his army. This was perhaps a carefully crafted strategy to gain sympathy, attention, and aid from the international community. Evidently, during the times of war, or post-war, as in Cambodia, tourism was more politically, than economically, driven.

On a larger scale, tourism’s effect needs to be understood within the context of the country, its governance, and the specific timeline within which certain tourism policies are employed. This is since many of the effects are due to the type of tourism employed, and the country’s governance environment. Therefore, for Cambodia and the PRK, the politics of its tourism needs to be analysed with acknowledgment of the specific kind of tourism it was promoting in accordance with its political goals. The PRK was specifically creating witnesses for Cambodia’s suffering, shifting the gaze and subjectivities of visitors from that of being tourists to that of being humanitarian actors. If further examined, this would also raise the question of how the PRK was taking a risk, walking on a tightrope recalling the “moral geographies of colonial philanthropy” by blurring the lines between tourism and humanitarian action.

Using culture, heritage, and history, and commodifying them to promote tourism can therefore also be a double-edged sword, as culture herein becomes a resource, which can be helpful during crises, but which may also itself become the source of conflicts. An example of this is Hong Kong and its pre- and post-1997 image construction. Before Hong Kong was handed over from its British colonisers to the People’s Republic of China, the role Hong Kong represented and performed was of the ‘exotic’ East mixed with Western colonial characteristics. However, post-handover, Hong Kong had to rework itself to maintain its appeal towards the West, while also showing itself as a site of Western cultural consumption for the increasing number of new tourists from the East. In this case, the ‘otherness’ of Hong Kong became its main attraction to visitors, and its ‘exotic’ appeal was taken advantage of by the tourism industry. Sum & Sorecount this with examples of tourist brochures, Hong Kong Tourist Association (HKTA), and tourist agencies co-opting cultural attractions. Hong Kong’s image was based on what would be politically advisable, as it was a partitioned state and had to play a balancing game between its portrayal in the eyes of the East and West.

In the international sphere, all countries partake in the use of tourism and its political outreach. Whether it is an explicit role that the state plays with regard to tourism, or more of an inactive official role, policy-making analysis shows that both are decisions consciously made by the state. Shaping citizens' views and constructing national identities and boundaries are done so in tandem with directing tourist activities. Even the commodification and commercialisation of culture, heritage, and entertainment done to attract tourists, while seemingly primarily led by economic goals, have underlying political goals. To ensure a smooth flowing global mobility regulation, political and economic goals must align, or at least find some common ground. Therefore, the aims and types of tourism differ, but the underlying linkage of politics to tourism is present regardless, whether it is with PRK and its tourism for aid and development, or China with its tourism for power and authority. With the pandemic still raging on in various countries, tourism is brought again into the loop of analysis with how decreases in tourism are negatively affecting dependent countries’ economies. Thus, future discussions would need to focus on what parts of their culture and heritage countries may begin using even more to market tourism as borders reopen, and how their foreign policies might work with vaccine diplomacy.

Author’s Bio

Suramya Srivastava has recently completed her Masters in International Development at the University of Warwick. She submitted her dissertation on “The Political Economy of Developmental Aid: A case study on the impact of Chinese aid and FDI in Cambodia.” Her areas of interest include international relations, sustainable development finance, and intersectional developmental issues, especially in the Asian region.

Mouzayian Khalil : 01 Dec 2021 14:28 |  Tags: Cambodia Cultural Heritage Tourism |  Comments (0) |  Close comments |  Report a problem