All 2 entries tagged Usa
July 10, 2012
With the end of June, officially, my 2-year research Tour of Europe has ended. I will keep this blog alive during the Summer, to report on local events (Olympics, Edinburgh Festival) and on a trip to Portugal, as well as the new unavoidable instalments of the Eurocrisis. But from October I will be back to teaching, take on more administrative tasks and all typing energies will need to be channelled to academic writing (apprently, this blog does not count as research publication). Not that anyone would be interested in a blog on Around Coventry, anyway.
And where did I end my 24-month European Tour? I thought of the Arc de Triomphe as in the Tour the France or Piazza del Duomo as in Giro d’Italia, and I inquired about the Olympic Stadium in London as in the Olympic marathon. But in order not to be partial among European countries, I eventually concluded outside Europe entirely, in its sociological mirror: the USA. Bar a passing touch-base on the Asian side of Istanbul, I had spent my two years entirely within the old continent. From a global perspective, I have stayed put in my little comfortable hole the whole time.
Despite the heat, it was worth spending 10 days on the East Coast and taking some healthy distance from Europe, without however really breaking away from it. The first stop was in Boston, as European as the States can get. I really realised I was in America on the second morning, when having breakfast in the same (European-style) cafe as the day before, and the waitress welcomed me with a loud, smiley “oh, hello! how are you todaaaay?! Same coffee as usual?” In Paris or Vienna, it takes 40 years to get the same degree of personal warmth from a cafe waiter as I had achieved by ordering two breakfasts in Boston.
It was in Boston that I could observe and discuss important news, from Europe where a hard-bargaining super-Mario Monti gained new money for the European South – oops, sorry, for the banks with debts in the European South, and from the US with the confusing Supreme Court’s ruling on Obamacare. It was amusing to observe Romney attacking Obamacare from Massuchussets, the same state where he introduced an identical reform... The ruling looks like a Pyrrhic victory for Obama: the penalties for not taking insurance are low and ineffective, having the law rejected on commerce rules undermines any improvement, and having it upheld as a tax does not make it popular. And again on Euronews, I was in a very mobilised North End (Little Italy) on the 1st of July for the Euro final – I prefer to remember the semifinal, which I watched in a sport bar in the company of, among others, the influential German professor... and I was surprised by how easily I could win an argument with him.
After Boston, a slow train journey away, it was the time of the much more American Philadelphia, spot on for the 4th of July. The heat didn’t prevent me to explore a bit, despite a busy schedule. At the Constitution Centre, arguably the largest and most important civic education facility in the world, there was an exhibition on Bruce Springsteen, ‘From Asbury Park to the Promised Land’ – it was meant about his link with the American polity, but somehow Woodie Guthrie’s influence was forgotten and the Boss’ recent more political songs were ignored. The US were in a much better light on the night of the 4th of July, with half a million people, of all colours, attending the concert and fireworks, peaceful, respectful and relaxed – they even did not mind having their pictures taken. America at its impressive best – shame that it won’t last like this for more than one night, and even during that night there three people were shot on the next street...
On the previous night, after a meal in Chinatown, I had had the brilliant idea of convincing a couple of friends to head to Northern Liberties, a reportedly lively alternative area with good live music. I had grossly miscalculated American distances and a 10-minute walk became a very long journey through the worst neighbourhoods of North Philadelphia. It was all fun in a way, although some became slightly concerned when two homeless blokes we asked for directions told us that they would avoid the neighbourhood we were entering...
Finally, I had 48 hours spare in New York, a place with which I hold a strong love/hate relationship due to old scores, and which in July is definitely not at its best. I stayed in beautiful black, and now more precisely black middle class Harlem, but music clubs were emptyish and tired (anyway, in the jazz/blues ones the only blacks are on stage - better with hip-hop, but I didn't make it to the big festival in Brooklyn). To escape the heat I wondered around some museums, Harlem Studio’s (excellent exhibit on the Caribbean), the MOMA (exhibits on photography, on fellow Italian, but even more fellow world citizen Alghiero Boetti, and most notably ‘Foreclosed: Rehousing the American Dream’, a timely reflection of the architectural and social disaster of the suburbs and on their alternatives) and the Met (all, more, but best?). The heat in New York tempted me to try the just opened new 1,500 people McCarren swimming pool complex in Brooklyn. Mind you, it is a public, free swimming pool complex: even America, sometimes, needs some important public, free services.
But I am already back to rainy England. Already missing the sun and the enthusiasm, but not really the food: after ten days of American diet I do not want to see a hamburger or a steak sandwich (the cheesesteaks of Philadelphia in particular) for at least a year. Of course, there are lots of alternatives in that land of opportunity. In Boston I had lobster in all shapes, which was fun even though the North Atlantic lobster is just a poor relative of the majestic Mediterranean lobster I used to have as a child as Sunday lunch at my granny’s in Sicily. In Philadelphia I spent time getting lost in the extremely varied Reading Terminal food market, and in New York you can eat as good food as anywhere. But still, behind its freedom and diversity, the American dream, even gastronomically, suffers from some serious imbalances.
August 03, 2011
In rapid succession during the last two weeks, EU and US have faced their own ‘five minutes before midnight’ crisis. Both have managed to find a way out, although it is not sure for how long: European markets are in crisis only few weeks later, and the US rating may well still be downgraded in a few months.
Politically, the interesting thing is that the EU solution (the Greek rescue deal of the 21st of July) came to many as a positive surprise: the EU and EMU were already seen as dying. By contrast, it came to many as a negative surprise that the US would be in such a dramatic situation ahead of this week’s deadline to raise the debt cap. This is because the EU has had for a long time a very bad press: in many regards it acts as a political scapegoat, an unelected body used to relieve national elected politicians of their responsibilities for anything that goes wrong. Just to the contrary, the US are often idealised, even by those who dislike it, as a ‘superpower’ able to decide and to act, unlike the headless EU. In fact, the crisis has shown that both EU and US are politically very dysfunctional. And economically in crisis: actually, despite all that has been said for about thirty years, the US are in a worse situation. Their debt is much bigger than the aggregate EU or EMU ones, and their economic and social fundamentals are also worse: higher unemployment, higher debt, worse trade deficit. In fact, once one looks at America, the ‘disastrous’ EMU problems strike for their small nature: all the fuss about Greece, but the whole Greek debt amounts to just 2.2% of the Eurozone's GDP. Even rescuing the whole of it would not be such a big cost for the EU, in the broader order of things and of the whole money spent to rescue the banks. The EU problem is political more than economic: it does not have the tools to face the economic problems.
If both EU and US are politically dysfunctional, they are so in very different, and sometimes, surprising, ways. Let’s look at the ways they have faced the crisis.
First, the EU deal. For an institution that has near-universal bad press, it was surprising to see, in the immediate aftermath of the last Greek rescue, a near-unanimous praise. This time, the Greek rescue was approved by all EMU countries, including the previously ‘refuseniks’ (and hyper-Thatcherite) Slovaks. The Greek rescue seemed in fact to achieve many things. First, it was bigger than the previous ones, evoking even the memory of the Marshall Plan. Second, it included a reasonable share of private sector contribution: about one third of what had been asked, but still substantial enough considering that banks wanted to pay nothing, as proven by the fact that the share prices of the contributing banks have been hit quite hard. Third, it reduced significantly the interest rates that Greece and the other rescued countries were paying, which at above 5% were making it impossible to get out of the hole. Fourth, by re-lending money over a period up to 40 (!) years, this was quite an ingenious way to cover up what looked like a default – or at least to stick it under the carpet. If one adds to this the plans for a long-needed European rating agency, the rescue package looked like a major step towards EU-level economic governance and fiscal federalism: with some fifteen years delay, the necessary political spill-over of EMU is starting to be conceived. This was positively surprising, considering the conflicts and divergences of the previous weeks - something we actually should be used to in the multi-level horse trading political system of the EU. Even more surprising, considering that only in Spring 2010 Merkel was still ridiculously defending the no-bailout article103 of the Maastricht Treaty – a ‘wishful thinking’ article which could have equally well declared ‘the EU does not use the umbrella, so it will never rain’.
Make no mistake: the rescue package was no political turning-point, which also explains the near-universal praise from Right to Left. The main source of re-adjustment still comes from public sector cuts. Banks still get more than what they pay for. The Eurobonds, as probably the best long-term solutions are still not in place, for the opposition of the Germans although probably they would cost them less than the continuous rescue packages may do. And there was only additional wishful thinking in the declaration that ‘Greece is exceptional’ and all other economies are fine. In fact, the speculative markets are now addicted to the drug of public rescue they have been intensively dispensed over the last 3-4 years, and after a short ‘high’ following the Greek rescue, have as usual come back wanting more within weeks – this time, from Italy and Spain. Nonetheless, a major step in policy-making capacity was visible from the deemed policy-making incapable EU elites.
Let's move to the US. If the complex EU policy making, requiring all member states’ unanimity for most issues, seems blocked, the US has done worse. With mid-term elections regularly punishing the president, it has been by now common to have at least one chamber in the hands of the opposition, and to make any meaningful political reform near-impossible. Only wars abroad can be still decided rather quickly. In addition, an electoral system that privileges the median voter, and that keeps half of the population away from the polls, distorts the whole political representation in favour of a mythical ‘middle America’. Add to it complex constitutional restrictions such as the debt limit itself, and populist practices like the recall vote, and the US found it dramatically difficult to take a decision even smaller than rescuing Greece: letting debt increase until they find a way to reduce it.
The eventual deal of the 31st December has been seen as a Republican triumph and thereby an Obama’s defeat: America has changed Obama, instead of Obama changing America; and ‘no, we can’t’ has become the sentence he is associated with. Sure, it does not increase tax, so the US are stuck with the unbelievably regressive system inherited from G.W. Bush (and punctually criticised by Hacker and Pierson in their works). In fact, the deal is not necessarily that bad for Obama. First, it postpone all meaningful cuts to after the elections of 2012 – so he will not pay too high a price for it, and if he wins, he may well abandon them subsequently. Secondly, the cuts include military expenditure – they may be even be more damaging for the Republicans. Third, the Tea Party is now officially in the establishment – their anti-establishment rhetoric, therefore, is from now empty.
So we have two mixed and messy decisions on both sides of the pond. Some deductions go against the common sense. First, unlike what we used to think, the EU is not less politically dysfunctional than the US. Second, neither is it more economically doomed. Third, however, on the economy the US are actually more democratic than the EU, in the sense that the debate is politicised and takes place in parliament and under close public scrutiny, unlike in obscure intergovernmental negotiations or through unelected bodies like European Central Bank and the European Commission.
These deductions could be seen as a vindication of the ‘technocratic’ nature of the EU: obscure technocracy, not democracy, is the only way to govern a complex economy like the European one, and it is proving more effective then the messy, populist US one. But there is a different conclusion. The EU’s legitimacy is actually lower than Obama’s, and unless it reduced some of its ‘democratic deficit’ (and not just the public finances’ one), it is doomed. But also, economic democracy is not something easy to build, and if it collapses into tax populism in the US, it is even more difficult in an international body like the EU. It requires institutions, public spheres, associations, starting from the local community and the workplace, up to the financial issues. But as Jean-Paul Fitoussi had written in 1995 (on the eve of the EMU), the debate on European political economy is ‘le débat interdit’. Let's try to start it.