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May 10, 2017

CES PG Conference 2017: Self–Reflection and Self–Criticism

Self-Criticism is not as harsh as it sounds, but regardless some people run away at the thought of being self-critical whilst others for whatever reason take self-criticism and use it as a form of self-destruction. The origin of this perspective involves a complex variety of social and psychological factors, leading to diverse conceptualisations of self-criticism, and of being self-critical. Being self-reflective and self-critical are important components of being an effective, reflexive researcher and therefore a part of professional development. I shall discuss the process of self-reflection and self-criticism in other blog posts but it suffices to say that they are key skills that enable the Ph.D. candidate, or anyone else, to analyse and think about a previous experience and its context, and to critically evaluate the experience and outcomes in order to identify current skills and knowledge gaps, and to plan effectively and appropriately.

Conferences offer excellent opportunities for self-reflection and self-criticism activities to take place through, for example, observations made and feedback given, and these activities can take place at both philosophical and methodological levels. There is much flexibility and adaptability in the approach to self-reflection and self-criticism therefore it’s up to you to decide what you think represents appropriate reflective and critical engagement.


Evaluation Of My Presentation Performance


The topic of the presentation related to the assessment of debates within a post-truth context where I provided the audience with my working definitions of post-truth within a general context, and within the specific context of social processes, followed by claims made by certain philosophers against the usefulness and effectiveness of debates, followed by the initial findings and thoughts of debates that I have observed. Given that this was the first ever time of presenting at a conference I am happy with the performance that I gave. I didn’t feel that nervous before or during the presentation although beforehand I was wondering if I could actually do this, which was completely irrational because I have presented before but not in front of a wider audience. The audience genuinely enjoyed the presentation and some came up to me for brief chats about the presentation, and importantly I was given important feedback which is being used as a focus for future planning and skills development all of which shall act as evidence for professional development.


From the feedback and from observing other presentations that took place I have come to know the way in which I can improve the presentation in terms of more engaging content, such as explaining more the context and the need for the research so that the audience is able to situate the research and the findings within a particular context. Thinking about the construction of the presentation I did actually begin to include information about the context of the research but I didn’t think this was important given that I wasn’t presenting a complete scenario or complete findings, as I emphasised at the beginning of the presentation, but I’ve now come to know that it is important to really elaborate further on definitions and contextual understandings regardless of the stage of research.


Evaluation of the Conference


It was a wonderful, engaging, thrilling and satisfying experience where I have not only been able to present but also been able to engage with other presenters and their presentations reflectively and critically, from both philosophical and methodological perspectives. Conservations with other Ph.D. candidates and the supervisor has led to new ideas and confirmed some ideas that I had but was not sure of, and these are currently being elaborated upon and therefore shall be discussed at some stage in future blog posts. The new and confirmed ideas are as follows:


· Increase scope of contextualisation in the thesis: explain the context within which learning processes are being explored, and argue why a particular context is of more interest than other contexts. This was going to be included in the first place, but its importance has been hinted to be of a substantial level especially in the social sciences and when substantive theories through grounded theory are being developed, as these theories appear to be relative and contextualised. Such explanations also need to be present in future presentations
· Provide a section relating to the theory-practice relationship. I knew this would be included, but it’s interesting to gather different opinions. The theory or model that I am creating will be useful in practice so I will need to fully elaborate in the thesis exactly the way in which the theory can change or assist practice, and vice versa
· Reconsider research methodology: philosophical approaches are fine I have no problem with my own philosophical perspectives as I think I can argue this in the thesis and in the viva examination (fingers crossed!) it’s just a matter of fully developing argumentation and elaboration of the way in which philosophical perspectives influence the research design and play a part in uniting the components. Grounded Theory is also fine: I do have the belief that a substantive theory that grounded theory enables to be developed is required. The only alteration is likely to be the dropping of the label “case study” and replace it with “case based.” The more I think about the way that I am exploring the phenomena of interest the more I’m realising that it’s not a full blown case study.
· Potentially increase the size and scope of the methodology chapter: a presenter made an important point that theses vary considerably in their chapter lengths from researcher to researcher. I am beginning to form extensive interest in Philosophy and Methodology and their relationship with each other; therefore, I have extensive interest in the way in which different components of the research design fit together. I have just about as much interest in research design itself as I do with the phenomena of interest, therefore I am thinking about extending the scope and size of the methodology chapter considerably.
· Consider further the role of emotional intelligence in social learning processes: an excellent presentation along with my own observations of the data has inspired me to think more about the role of emotional intelligence when analysing social learning processes. This is all part of exploring and thinking about social learning processes from as a wide, diverse amount of perspectives as possible

Summary


The conference provided an excellent platform of self-reflection and self-criticism, and therefore assisted with identifying new directions that were not previously considered important to the research, and assisted with developing solutions to any concerns that I had. I am happy with the performance that I gave and I realise where improvements can be made, and happy with engaging with other presenters and presentations allowing me to reflect and critique my own research; therefore, identifying possible directions to take the research. An excellent conference in general!


May 01, 2017

My Current Thinking About Grounded Theory

As mentioned in the previous blog post I still have many unanswered questions, and whilst some questions have been answered and thoughts have been developed from reading many research papers and textbooks, which itself is an ongoing task, many of these questions will be answered as I continue to code through the data and experiment with different Grounded Theory procedures. Experimenting with these procedures shall assist with my understanding, decision and selection justification of the most appropriate procedure for the type of data, disciplinary contexts, and the phenomena itself.


My Current Philosophical Position

At the Philosophical level, I am aligning with the idea of Philosophical fluidity: because Glaser’s writings have been interpreted as philosophically neutral (although there are writings that do suggest that it leans methodologically towards positivism, and some suggest critical realism) and Strauss and Corbin’s writings suggest non-formal adherence to procedures, along with their later writings lining out pragmatism and symbolic interactionism as being the underlying theories of their grounded theory, it can be argued that Grounded Theory encourages philosophical fluidity.


Because my philosophical beliefs align with a realist philosophy; specifically, a realist ontology and an interpretivist, critical epistemology (ideas are continuously being developed here) I can safely reject Charmaz and Clarke’s variants of Grounded Theory as they align themselves with constructivism and post-modernism respectively. I can also argue the rejection of Bryant’s Grounded Theory as appropriate as it aligns with a Pragmatist philosophy but this might not be black or white as I am currently engaged with debates about the methodological level of grounded theory.

Methodological Considerations

My current engagement with the methodological aspect of grounded theory refers to the following questions:


Which procedures of grounded theory are most relevant to a realist conceptualisation of Grounded Theory? Therefore, which version of Grounded Theory out of Glaser, Strauss or even Bryant would be most relevant? Would I have to think about a combination of procedures? Or do I have to in some way create a new procedure? A specific focus in answering this question revolves around debates of Axial Coding, and its relevance to the context of research.


Another question is, what difference does coding for a process introduce to Grounded Theory? Grounded Theory has most popularly been used for coding for experiences and beliefs of a phenomena as opposed to coding for structure and sequences of a process in non-interview based documents and transcripts. From my ongoing readings, I have not come across much literature that covers grounded theory use for developing a substantive theory from observations of a process, as opposed to building a theory from experiences and beliefs.


Therefore, following from this, in what way does a realist Philosophy contribute towards understanding a process from non-interview documents as opposed to understanding a process from the beliefs and experiences of participants as reported in interview based transcripts? What are the philosophical differences here in general? I know that constructivism relates to interview based transcripts, but what about realism and interpretivism and their links with non-interview based documents? Can we assume that interpretivism is some internal process of meaning making and application of meaning on constructs and aspects of reality (reality of the argumentation process) we consider real? What can a realist Philosophy say about qualitative data in general, in contrast with or complementary to constructivist perspectives?


Reflection and Pushing Forwards


Comparing my thoughts documented in much earlier blog posts I do appear to be more settled on grounded theory from a Philosophical perspective and continuously building philosophical arguments for grounded theory. The main area of current contention is the methodological level; specifically, knowing the exact grounded theory procedures to use and this can only be understood as I progress through coding of data and experiment with coding procedures complemented by appropriate reading. Further questions revolve around the way in which the type of theory produced from grounded theory (known as a substantive theory) explains the phenomena of research, and in what way this type of theory can develop into formal theory in the future beyond the Ph.D.


There is a lot to think about here, but I feel that I am placed somewhere in the middle of everything: I am coming from that land of philosophical and methodological confusion of wondering what on Earth do I use and why, to coming to be settled on philosophical perspectives and general methodological approaches. What I am starting to do now is push myself along this philosophical and methodological spectrum towards the side where I am developing philosophical justifications and arguments for the research design, and generally understanding, experimenting with and justifying selections of variants of grounded theory approaches.


Therefore, I have come from the land of philosophical and methodological confusion (Genesis if you’re reading this, no plagiarism intended) to a general sense of philosophical and methodological clarity although specific confusion (for lack of a better term) still exists, and now pushing myself towards specific and detailed clarity. I can tell this is happening because I have felt ready to start writing the thesis, and I have already made a formal start to drafting sections.


Onwards!


Grounded Theory: Philosophically, Methodologically, and Disciplinary fluid?

Grounded theory initially appeared straightforward but it did not take long to realise its complex nature and intense debates surrounding philosophical, methodological and, most recently discovered, disciplinary issues. I first encountered grounded theory through Charmaz’s Constructivist Grounded Theory and read through her book thinking that it would be most relevant to my philosophical beliefs at the time. As I understood the phenomena of interest and the general context of my research through much reading of existing empirical literature revolving around the phenomena of interest, I began to realise that I’m not a constructivist, but a realist. Constructivism and therefore constructivist grounded theory became increasingly irrelevant because of its leaning towards there being multiple realities (I have a belief in a single reality, but not a single reality that is easily discoverable or understood) and an emphasis of the co-construction of meaning between researcher and participant (context of my research does not facilitate such a relationship). I therefore discovered the works of Glaser and Strauss (1968) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) and to this day it hasn’t been easy to decide which is the most relevant to my research and there is a reason for this, which I shall explain further.


There are several key authors of grounded theory: Glaser and Strauss (1968), Strauss and Corbin (1990), Charmaz (2000), Clarke (2003) and Bryant (2016), with each contextualising grounded theory within different philosophical assumptions and methodological approaches (as in, different coding procedures from what I can currently understand). Charmaz as mentioned contextualised grounded theory within a constructivist philosophy following criticisms of Glaser and Strauss’s approaches as leaning too much towards positivism, whilst Clarke positioned Grounded Theory within the context of post-modernism following criticisms of all previous versions. Bryant makes Grounded Theory relevant to practice-based research by positioning Grounded Theory within a Pragmatist philosophy. All these different versions of Grounded Theory have arguably come about through the professional separation of the pioneers of Grounded Theory: Glaser and Strauss.


Initially, Glaser and Strauss were united in their criticisms of social science research and the dominating positivist, objectivist, theory testing approaches to understanding the social world, and embarked on a mission to change that and eventually developed Grounded Theory, which initially was an inductive approach to develop a theory to explain social phenomena.


After a while however, the disciplinary differences and, therefore, theoretical differences between Glaser and Strauss led to their professional break up with each following their own paths to developing grounded theory, with Glaser’s version becoming known as Classical Grounded Theory, whilst Strauss’ version became known as Straussian Grounded Theory. Discussion of the exact differences between the two is beyond the purpose of this blog post but it suffices to say that Straussian Grounded Theory focusses more on combining theory building and theory testing approaches (inductive-deductive or some form of abductive logic) and consists of an extra coding procedure known as Axial Coding, which has been the subject of much criticism from Glaser and Charmaz, and much debate among other authors.


Glaser himself in various research papers and books has highly criticised Straussian Grounded Theory for being too prescriptive and therefore limiting theoretical creativity; however, Strauss and Corbin have both stated that Grounded Theory researchers should not follow a strict adherence to Grounded Theory procedures, but to view the procedures as a guide and therefore adapt according to their research context. And this, I would argue, is where we find the roots of much diversity and fluidity within grounded theory.


Philosophical and Methodological Fluidity


From the writings of Glaser it appears that he opposes the different versions of grounded theory arguing they have transitioned beyond the point where they can reasonably be called Grounded Theory.


The problem with this opposition however is that it has been argued that Glaser’s Grounded Theory is philosophically neutral and can therefore be aligned with any Philosophical position. It’s almost as if Glaser’s opposition focusses on methodological differences rather than Philosophical differences, but it’s the very argument that Philosophy influences methodology that suggests the existence of both philosophical and methodological fluidity. Glaser’s apparent Philosophical neutrality and Strauss and Corbin’s recommendations not to subscribe to strict adherence of Grounded Theory procedures evidences the existence of this fluidity of movement between differing Philosophical positions therefore enabling different variations to be presented. But there is a near limitless debate about this fluidity from all the key authors of Grounded Theory along with discussions from other methodologists and qualitative researchers, but in general there is movement towards this fluidity within research designs as written by some key contemporary methodological authors, all of which I shall be covering in the thesis to some extent.


Disciplinary fluidity


A paper written by Carter and Little (2007) has recently begun to encourage me to think further about the use of Grounded Theory in my research. They present a series of hypothetical scenarios involving a fictional character named “Anna” and a series of considerations she has had to make when designing a research study, and the eventual selection of grounded theory in her study. Briefly, this is encouraging me now to think more about disciplinary assumptions and disciplinary contexts that shall play host to Grounded Theory, and in what exact way and why certain grounded theory procedures are relevant to the discipline within which the phenomena of interest is situated. Additionally, I have to think more about the genesis of the particular version of grounded theory that I desire to use.


Therefore, currently I plan to use Strauss and Corbin’s variant of Grounded Theory. But I have many questions now particularly surrounding the debate about axial coding. I shall be covering some of these questions and thoughts in the next blog post.


References:


Bryant, A (2017): "Grounded Theory and Grounded Theorising: Pragmatism in Research Practice," Published by Oxford University Press


Carter, S.M., Little, M "Justifying Knowledge, Justifying Method, Taking Action: Epistemologies, Methodologies, and Methods in Qualitative Research," Qualitative Health Research, 17 (10), pp 1316 - 1328


Charmaz, K (2014): "Constructing Grounded Theory" (2nd Edition). Published by Sage


Clark, A.E (2003): "Situational Analyses: Grounded Theory Mapping After The Postmodern Turn," Symbolic Interaction, 26 (4), pp 553 - 576


Glaser, B.G., Strauss, A, L (1967): "The Discovery of Grounded Theory," Published by Aldine Transactions


Strauss, A.L., Corbin, J. (1990): "Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory" Published by Sage. (Note that updated editions have been published throughout the years)


March 29, 2017

It's All Starting To Click!

Within the early stages of the Ph.D. you shall be forgiven if you arrive at early conclusions regarding the relationship between philosophy, methodology, methods and data. It is easy in the early stages to subscribe to the notion that, for example, qualitative data and qualitative inquiry in general is situated only within a combined Philosophy of relativist ontology / subjectivist epistemology; similarly, it’s easy to subscribe to the notion that qualitative data comes only from interview methods.


Why is this the case?


I arrived at these assumptions prior to and early in the Ph.D, based on what I was reading at the time. Research papers gave the impression that statistical analysis and experimental designs aligned only with objectivist perspectives and that qualitative data and associated analysis aligned only with a subjectivist perspective. However, the more I read the more I questioned my own assumptions about the relationship between philosophy, methodology and methods and found that this relationship is far more dynamic than I had imagined, and that really there is no such thing as a linear relationship between them. This relationship is fluid, and the more I read and thought about my own beliefs I am now finding much fluidity even between ontological and epistemological perspectives, and this is what I shall initially call Design Flexibility.


Design Flexibility


Design flexibility does not adopt a sceptical perspective of the existence of an actual relationship between philosophy, methodology and methods, but is sceptical of any assumptions of a linear relationship where a particular perspective entails the choosing of other specific perspectives. There is no rejection to the idea that ontological perspectives influence epistemological perspectives, which in turn influence methodological perspectives, but there is a rejection of a predetermined linear relationship. More recent methodological textbook authors arguably lean heavily in the direction of philosophical and methodological dynamism therefore acknowledging that reality and our understanding of reality is so complex that there are limitless ways in which reality can be perceived and the way in which we come to know this reality, which influences the way in which we explore this reality.


Applied to my own thinking, my philosophical beliefs line with subtle realism, developed by Hammersley. Typically, a realist ontology is accompanied by an objectivist epistemology suggesting a reality independent of our thinking and knowing, and knowledge of this reality being discoverable and accessible within this reality as knowledge itself exists independently of our minds. But design flexibility suggests that even though the realist ontology and objectivist epistemology is commonly observed particularly in the natural sciences, it doesn’t mean that they are in a strict dependent relationship. Hence, my epistemological beliefs align with subjectivism: I perceive a reality independent of our minds but we do not have access to all knowledge and truths of this reality. We will never come to fully know or grasp objective reality and truth of this reality through our perceptions and theories about what is occurring within this reality: the best that we can do, and the best that I can do with the theory that I am developing, is to represent certain actions and events within reality without claiming that I know for certain that what I theorise is really what is happening.


Another example of design flexibility is at the methodology level. Typically, qualitative inquiries are not associated with realist philosophies as they are mostly aligned with constructivist or interpretivist based perspectives (relative ontology; subjectivist epistemology) but I am attempting to place my qualitative inquiry within the context of realist ontology, subjectivist epistemology with the type of subjectivism leaning towards interpretivism. There is a small but growing body of literature that suggests the usefulness of qualitative inquiries being situated within this philosophical context therefore it is an aim of mine to attempt to contribute towards further discussion and development of this area of qualitative inquiries.


Then there are the methods and various qualitative approaches within which these methods are situated. Qualitative inquiries can not only be situated within a variety of different ontological and epistemological combinations but also adopt a variety of possible different general approaches with the most typical being ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory and case study, but there are many more approaches and each of these can typically be combined e.g., an ethnographic case study. The qualitative approaches that shall be used are case study and grounded theory.


And to add to this already banging-head-on-keyboard-moment-as-you-work-through-all-this-stuff are the various types of case studies and the various types of grounded theories that have to be selected or further developed if no existing version exactly matches research aims and general context of the research design. For example, because of the adopted philosophical perspectives, I have to not only think of ways in which the particular type of case study and particular type of grounded theory adopted, or further developed, in this research work with each other, but work with each other within the philosophical perspective, which should lead to plenty of opportunities to expand on current discussions and development of research designs.


What has been discussed in this blog post is not the full story either: there is so much more beyond what I have discussed here but for the purpose of this blog (and my sanity) I have kept discussions brief and relative to my continuous thinking and development progress,


There you have it: completely and utterly bewildering and confusing at first, but keep fighting your way through because it is worth it. I think, perhaps, yeah, it is, I’ll let you know in time……..


March 19, 2017

Realism: ontological or epistemological version?

A key early sub-question that relates to the version of realism to implement is to decide if the version of realism that is being implemented refers to ontology or epistemology. Remember that ontology deals with the existence and state of being and what there is in reality that is real, whilst epistemology deals with whether or not we can come to know something about reality and if this is possible, to what extent can we know something and the way in which we can know something. I have decided upon the philosophical classification of realism but before I get to that point, I’ll provide arguably simplistic conceptualisations of each that suffices for the purposes of this blog post.

Ontological and Epistemological Realism:

Philosophical discussions relevant to research and knowing relates specifically to the idea of truth about reality. Is there such a thing as objective truth, and if so in what way can we come to know this truth about reality? What does this truth consist of and in what way can we understand aspects of this truth? Does objective truth exist or is truth simply a subjective construction invented in our own minds? If objective truth exists can we really attain it? Or, is it simply that what we know and theories progressively move towards objective truth? Although there is much debate, differences and variants of realism at both the ontological and epistemological levels it suffices for the purpose of this post to give the following basic and far too overgeneralising conceptions (but it’s a start!):


Ontological realism can be defined in general as arguing for objective truth that exists independently of our minds, as opposed to ontological idealism that suggests that mind and reality are as a single unit. Objective truth exists and therefore all assumptions, theories, beliefs and ideas that we form must be tested against this truth of reality therefore truth of reality is knowable.


Epistemological realism argues that knowledge itself exists independently of our minds; that knowledge is not a construction within our minds as is believed by epistemological idealists, but that knowledge is discoverable and attainable outside of the mind. The knowledge or perceptions that we hold in our minds about reality corresponds with reality itself; there is a correspondence between what we know, and the way that the world is, with this knowing attained through our experiences and interactions within the world.

Both ontological and epistemological realisms are much debated and discussed in philosophical and research methodology textbooks and published papers.

My Stance: Ontological Realism

The category of focus for my research is ontological realism, because I have the belief that there are universal and objective truths independent of whether or not we perceive, experience, or know about this truth and the extent of objectivity. I cautiously reject epistemological realism because I do not have the belief that what we know about the world corresponds with the way that the world is, because our mental states (knowledge, perceptions and so on) and cognitive processes (the act of perceiving, theorising, knowing, thinking and so on) are fallible. Therefore, whilst I do have the belief in objective truth and that aspects of reality do exist independent of our minds, we cannot really fully know this objective truth or objective reality: the best we can achieve is to progress towards objective truth but never actually attain it. And that from a general perspective and relative to my current understanding and knowledge relates well to my case study methodology and grounded theory method.


Brief Introduction to Realism and my Research: Initial Key Questions

When you have defined the limits of your discussions the next step is to define the key questions that shall help you to begin your further explorations and developments of your philosophical justifications. For me, the key questions are: what kind of realism am I talking about? And, what does realism offer to my research methodology?


What kind of realism?

As part of the philosophical justifications it’s important to be clear on the variant of realism that you are adopting for your research, and there are many variants of Realism in existence within the social sciences with the most popular being Critical Realism. When I adopted a mixed methods methodology I did begin to propose critical realism as the underpinning Philosophy, but began to doubt the relevancy of the human-structure relationship and the general idea of causality in the social sciences. I shall talk about this more in the future as my understanding further increases but essentially, critical realism defines a three layered ontology and has the aim of locating unobservable causes of observable phenomena within the social sciences, and it’s the notion of causality that I have trouble accepting as the way in which to understand social phenomena. Hence, I’ve moved away from critical realism but subscribe to a realist philosophy in general.

A current task therefore is investigating different types of realism to find out if any existing versions align with my own thinking about reality, or if I have to develop my own realist philosophy, or build upon previous realist ideas in some way. This will take some time to develop but this is a key question when it comes to communicating and elaborating on your realist philosophy in your thesis.

Do note that I am not suggesting that critical realism is not important in Educational research, but for my specific research I no longer feel that it is appropriate in accordance to my own beliefs, and also the phenomena of exploration.

What does Realism offer to methodology?

Not only is it best to explain the variant of realism that you are adopting or developing, but also the way in which that variant links in with and guides the methodology. What are the precise details of the realist approach and in what way does it align with and support the progress of the methodology? This is an area that is currently under continuous development, reformulation and reconstruction as I learn more about the variants of realism and the way in which realism feeds into my methodology.

A key benefit with the methodology I am using is that case study and grounded theory are philosophical-independent, meaning that they can work with a variety of different philosophical positions and therefore there is no right or wrong answer. The way in which realism needs to be implemented is dependent on the phenomena of interest, the research problem, and the research question. This is exactly where it is important to fully elaborate on your philosophical justifications for the methodology that you are using, and to explain why realism is the most appropriate philosophical approach compared to other approaches. What is it exactly about your approach that makes your approach to realism suitable and relative to the context of exploration?

In summary:

This is all work in progress, but no matter what I have read and what I have looked at, and from the trial study, realism is what makes the most sense to me based on the phenomena of interest and the way in which I am collecting the data. It is argued in some cases that philosophical perspectives can change as a person really delves into the research and collects and analyses the data. Whilst this is true, and I have read earlier about a couple of Ph.D. candidates who transitioned from critical realism to social constructionism, I am cautiously and currently convicted by my beliefs in a realist perspective of reality.


Brief Introduction to Realism and my Research: context and boundaries

Long term blog readers will no doubt have had their brains melted as I have debated and discussed the use of different philosophical perspectives as a guide for the research methodology, beginning with a constructivist perspective before navigating towards and settling on a realist philosophy. Subsequently, methodology has transitioned from pure grounded theory methodology, to a mixed methods methodology with grounded theory used as a method, before navigating towards and settling on a case study methodology using grounded theory as a method, using a realist philosophy to guide the methodology. Feel free to have a search about my blog to find relevant discussions!

I have been thinking about this for a long time now, and a realist approach is the only overarching philosophical approach that makes sense to the context of my research; therefore, I am beginning to understand and further develop my philosophical justifications and arguments for realism as a philosophical drive for my research design. It is such a complex area however with many variants, directions, debates, discussions and applications; therefore, there needs to be a series of limits set to what can realistically be explored and discussed in the thesis, and on this blog. These limits I find come naturally within the boundaries of my research.

Limits Of Realist Discussions

Different people will have different approaches, but for me so far it’s easier to contextualise discussions of realism within the boundaries of my own research. It is important to lay out a set of limits because it will keep you focussed about what you need to explore, and what you need to discuss in terms of your philosophical justification and the way in which it applies to your research methodology. It’s easy to travel off in different directions as realism like any philosophical perspective is vast, complex and well debated and discussed.

The following are limitations that I have placed on my own investigations and discussions of realism:
· I talk about realism only in the context of social sciences and not the natural sciences
· I talk about realism only in the context of qualitative research
· I talk about realism only in the context of case study methodology
· I talk about realism only in the context of grounded theory method
· I talk about realism specific to the type of case study and grounded theory used

Obviously this blog is not as “formal” or “academic” as the thesis therefore I shall be a little less restrictive about these compared to the thesis so I can talk about, for example, realism in other methodologies and compare to the selected methodology of case study in general. I can also do this in the thesis but it would be more specific, e.g., I assume it would be important for example to compare the use of realism in phenomenology and case study relative to the phenomenon of investigation, as this can contribute to the philosophical justification of the selected philosophical perspective.

A Guide, Not A Strict Structure!

It’s important to some extent to treat these limits as a guide rather than an absolute rigid structure of discussions. Think about it as being set free within the boundaries of your research as defined by the discipline in general, and the overall research design. There is little point, for example, in talking about realism in phenomenological research if your research design is not based on phenomenology; however, that doesn’t stop you from discussing realism applications within that methodology if you can apply it in some way that is relevant to your own methodology. That’s an example of what I am talking about in terms of being set free within the boundaries of your research.

Now that limits have been set, key questions must be asked that shall help develop an overview of what needs to be known, and this is the subject of the next blog post.


February 26, 2017

Philosophical Domains

Three Domains Of Philosophy


I have now at this point identified three domains of Philosophical considerations that a Ph.D. candidate might want to engage with whilst developing a philosophical understanding of their research. The three domains are:


The Philosophy Of The Self


This domain deals with the ontological and epistemological beliefs of reality, and therefore the way in which we situate ourselves within the context of the perceived reality. These beliefs form our perception of reality and answer questions such as: in what way do we perceive reality itself? In what way can we come to know this reality that we perceive?


At the ontological level there is a spectrum of beliefs that span from realism on one side to relativism on the other side with the different points in between determining the extent to which aspects of reality is either dependent on or independent of the actions of the mind. A realist perceives a reality that is independent of the thoughts and actions of the mind but the points along the spectrum progresses from a view of reality as being fully independent of the mind to a view that suggests there are aspects of reality that are dependent on the mind. On the relativism side, different flavours or points of relativism progresses from aspects of reality that are dependent on the mind to a reality that is fully dependent on the mind or in other words that reality is nothing more than what exists within our minds; our perceptions and beliefs mirrors reality itself.


Epistemological beliefs relate to the way in which we come to know reality and from what I can understand there are more theoretical categories of beliefs at this level than at the ontological level and it would take a long time to go through each theory on a single blog post but suffice to say that epistemological beliefs are, like ontological beliefs, situated along a spectrum with objectivism on one side and subjectivism on the other side. Objectivism states that knowledge of reality already exists therefore knowledge of reality is discovered and not constructed; knowledge of reality is attained through the belief that reality is a single layer, and that knowledge of this single layer reality is accessible through variables and experiments involving these variables and a researcher acting as a conductor and not a constructor of knowledge. Subjectivism is the exact opposite: knowledge of reality does not exist independently of the mind therefore knowledge is constructed and not discovered; knowledge is attained through the idea that there is more than a single layer to reality; and therefore knowledge of reality is obtained through understanding and exploring people situated within that reality via more qualitative methods such as ethnography.


This domain is important to engage with because if we become more engaged with our own philosophical beliefs about reality we can provide a philosophical justification for the research design and indeed for the selection of the phenomenon of interest in some way. This philosophical justification is itself a big subject but it suffices to say that philosophical justifications enable us to better explain and argue the way in which we come to know reality, the way we come to gain knowledge about reality, and the way in which reality is explored in order to gain this knowledge.


My beliefs about reality are based on ontological realism and epistemological subjectivism (relativism), but still working out which exact flavour of each my thoughts align with. But at a general level I do not accept that there is a reality that is fully independent of our minds but at the same time I do not accept that there is a reality that is fully dependent on our minds.



The Philosophy Of Research Design


The philosophical beliefs that we have about reality acts as an input to the research design hence the importance of engaging with our own selves as researchers and our philosophical beliefs.


I have discussed extensively (relatively speaking), and shall continue to do so, about the different philosophies that I have been considering for my research and that I have now selected for the research. Regardless of which philosophies have been selected, it is clear that my philosophical beliefs have guided not only the general selection of a case study grounded theory based research design, but the specific types of case study and grounded theory approaches. It’s important to remember here that there are multiple key writers that have detailed different types of case study and grounded theory approaches situated within different philosophies. Also, away from the key writers there have been other versions of both case study and grounded theory developed, and there will no doubt continue to be different versions developed, led by particular philosophical beliefs.


My own philosophical justification for using case study and grounded theory and the way in which they are being used is being guided by realism and relativism, but without a strict adherence to absolute realism and absolute relativism. These philosophical thoughts are being continuously thought about and explored. It is a substantial area of discussion and debate.



The Philosophy Of The Phenomenon Of Interest


This is a new consideration that I have come across recently and needs more elaboration and exploration before I can begin to define any definite ways in which the phenomenon is being perceived philosophically. But to explain briefly, in general and not specific to my research there appears to be learning processes and sub-learning processes, which can be categorised as either individual learner based, or collaborative or group based. There are many of these processes: it would be fairly easy to develop a Ph.D. proposal based on just a single learning process or sub-process nevermind an actual category, once you were aware of the literature and existing problems!


What I am considering at the moment, and again I can make no commitment to any actual statements of knowing about this area, is the relationship between my own philosophical perspectives of the learning process as I am coding and exploring these processes, and the philosophical perspectives that the research participants might have taken in their demonstration of learning processes. Here we can branch out into many different directions because the philosophical considerations of these processes go right back to Ancient Greece where the likes of Socrates and Aristotle defined certain processes in an absolute and certain way: that learners could engage with their learning in an absolute and certain way. Contemporary philosophers consider more uncertain and relativist approaches to engagement with learning processes and its impact on, for example, the construction of knowledge within learning contexts.


But there are many social and cognitive processes of learning, and whilst there have been much written on these processes there is much that is still to be written and discovered about them. The philosophy of the learning process is something that I have come across recently and still elaborating ideas on and reading about therefore I cannot at this time put forward any detailed arguments of the way in which I am viewing learning processes.



Domain Interconnection


My thoughts on the interconnections between the aforementioned domains, like my thoughts on the philosophy of learning processes, are in their early exploration and development stages. However, early indications show that there is a relationship between these three domains of philosophical considerations, there just needs to be further explorations and readings into what exactly this relationship is, what it entails, what it impacts, and what conditions are required for a relationship and different types of such relationships to exist.


Are my philosophical beliefs of reality providing an impact not just on the development of the research design, but also the way in which I perceive or view the learning processes?


Are my philosophical beliefs influencing the way in which I perceive participant approaches and perspectives of their learning processes?


Could a mismatch exist between the way that I perceive demonstrated learning processes, and the way in which participants perceive them?


Is there ultimately an ideal way in which learning processes should be perceived philosophically?


These are just few of the questions that I have with regards to this incredibly complex and challenging area of thinking and development, but it is worthwhile engaging with your own beliefs and engage with plenty of reading in order to develop and fully elaborate on a philosophical justification or serious of justifications as to why you are doing what you are doing. It is worthwhile engaging with your own beliefs as you can fit your research and yourself within the domains of philosophical considerations. A challenging area, but a worthwhile investment!


February 12, 2017

Latest Ph.D. Work Update!

Changes to Thesis, Upgrade Paper, and the Influence of Research Directions


Both the thesis and the upgrade paper have had significant changes made during the year so far in terms of their structure, particularly the thesis, and their content, particularly the upgrade paper. As I mentioned in the previous blog post the fact that a document has been rewritten several times shows progress of ideas and research directions, and different versions can act as a means of reflecting on the journey that has been made and the distance that the research has come. What’s useful is the continuous rewriting and editing efforts of the upgrade paper have acted as a guide for editing the structure and planned content of the thesis, particularly its literature review and background chapters. As a result all previous planned versions of the background and literature review chapters have been binned.


The change to both documents has come about through a more detailed exploration of a particular learning process that resulted in identification of a specific sub-process that appears to act as the backbone to many other sub-processes to a certain extent, as well as generating more concepts from existing literature that shall contribute towards contextualising the research in the literature review. The specific sub-process remains under researched: there are models and theories available that explain this particular process but I don’t think they are adequate or substantial enough to really explain what is going on within this process and its relationship with other sub-processes. That’s not to say that these models and theories should be considered no longer important: they are in particular contexts depending on the purpose and aim of the research, but for me they don’t explain the process in a particular way that I think is important and I think has been largely neglected.


All these changes to the research directions since the upgrade presentation have entailed the discussed changes to the thesis and the upgrade paper. The aim of the upgrade paper is still to prove the worth of my research, whereas the aim of the thesis is to communicate the completed research and its outcomes. An aim of the literature review now is to contextualise my own research through evaluating and critiquing the existing models and theories (as well as introducing relevant philosophical, theoretical, psychological and empirical concepts and literature) therefore identifying gaps within current research, and explain the way in which my research shall contribute towards solving identified issues.


The key here is to know where to start: and that is the challenge! Developing the structure however is helping me to know where to start, because structuring a literature review or any other chapter of the thesis or any other academic document means setting a structure for ideas. But this is in a non-regimented way: structuring ideas does not entail strict adherence therefore sections of each chapter can be chopped or changed around. It is up to you to decide the way in which your own literature review is structured, based on what you have read, the concepts you have developed from the literature, the critiques and evaluations of existing theories and models, and the categories within which you have placed the concepts you have developed as well as other thoughts, notes and analysis of the literature you have carried out. This is an ongoing and continuous task.



Philosophical Ideas


The more I read into philosophical ideas the more that I am beginning to be convinced of an ontological realism and epistemological relativism as being appropriate for my research, but it’s important to note that these are not exactly strictly adhered to. It has to be noted that I am not claiming to be a strict ontological realist and a strict epistemological relativist: these points are acting as a starting base for the research. Both points are the foundations for more substantial explorations into philosophical thinking and theories about the research design.


Currently, there are various philosophical writers that I am currently taking an interest in and are currently influencing my philosophical understanding of reality, and these are: Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, Popper’s Critical Rationalism, Hume and Kant’s discussions on causality, and various writings on fallibility, defeasibility, and social constructivism. From my current understanding all these different concepts of our understanding of reality is compatible with variants of realism and variants of relativism. Variants that recognise whilst there are aspects of reality that exist independent of our minds, not everything is independent; and, whilst objective knowledge and truth of reality might exist, attaining objective truth and knowledge of reality is difficult to achieve. I am beginning to form the belief that we will never achieve fully objective truth as our perspectives are all subjective to some extent. The best that can be achieved is to edge closer towards the truth and knowledge of reality.


Building the starting platform around ontological realism and epistemological relativism enables the beginnings of a philosophical justification for the research design, which is in addition to the methodological justifications built from knowledge gaps identified through analysing and synthesising research findings and the methodological approaches behind these findings.


The thesis is said to include several pages of philosophical insights therefore it is likely that an argument or even a small series of arguments shall be provided and fully elaborated upon, linking to the case study methodology and the grounded theory and interview methods. Providing a philosophical justification as well as a methodological (e.g., why is a particular research design use? Why are various components being used and in what way are they related through philosophy? Etc.), and practical justifications (e.g., why should the particular phenomenon be of interest? Why is the phenomenon of interested being explored using a particular research design?) That way, the thesis shall present cohesive, well structured, well grounded and logically and significantly elaborated research.


In summary


Upgrade paper has more or less been completed and was sent earlier the previous week for feedback, whilst the thesis is ongoing, as are therefore philosophical considerations. I am pleased with the progress that I have made, and moving forwards now it’s just a continuous case of developing the structure of the background and literature review chapters, as well as the methodology chapter, continue to code the data, continue to evaluate and synthesise existing literature, and continue to build a philosophical justification as well as fully elaborate on methodological and phenomena based justifications.


January 23, 2017

The Problem With Reality

Positivist perspective suggests reality is fully independent of human perceiving, thinking, knowing and knowledge of that reality, with all knowledge of that reality being readily accessible to the researcher through objectivist methods e.g., experimental methods and closed ended surveys. Interpretivism suggests reality is fully constructed within the mind, therefore fully dependent on the mind, and therefore no reality or aspect of reality exists independently of human perception or knowledge of it therefore our understanding and knowledge of reality mirrors reality itself. Realism suggests that there is a reality independent of the human mind but we cannot ever attain a full understanding of it, whilst Pragmatism does not really care either way (basically). At least, this is the way that onotological beliefs are presented in typical academic texts and research papers but in reality (no pun intended) there are nuances within each therefore the spectrum of ontological beliefs is more complex than what most authors tend to express. And, this is where my problem is.


Typically, a researcher at the ontological level is defined as either a realist, where there is a reality independent of the human mind, or a non-realist, where to some extent the researcher perceives reality as being dependent on the human mind. But in the context of my research and as a researcher, I find it difficult to imagine a reality that is completely independent of all human perceiving, understanding, and knowing. There simply cannot be a reality that is completely independent of the human mind when it comes to social sciences because humans are far too complex socially, emotionally, cognitively, spiritually and psychology to simply dismiss as empty states within research projects. Researchers also cannot be treated as empty states completely divorced from any influence upon the research process, as they come with a background of experience, perspectives, knowledge and preconceptions. Conversely, there simply cannot be a reality that is fully dependent on the mind of the participant or the researcher; in other words, I find it difficult if not impossible to imagine a reality that is constructed solely by our language, thoughts, perceptions, knowledge and experiences of that reality. This is primarily because ordinary observers can be misguided in some way with their thoughts, perceptions, knowledge and experiences of reality: just because we observe empirically that a stick bends in water does not mean that a stick really bends when it enters water. The mental states that are involved with developing our thoughts and perceptions might not be functioning properly, and therefore perceive objects that might not actually exist, or have certain thoughts that do not mirror what is really going on in that reality external to the observer, or believer. Or, we might have a sound set of mental states involved with the production of our perceptions and interpretations, but objects might be perceived differently based on our knowledge schemes and definitions of these objects. I’ll give an example:


Is a mountain bike a mountain bike because of a successful mapping between our knowledge schema and the reality of a bike? Or is it a mountain bike because of the way that we perceive its behaviour perhaps based on an internal knowledge schema: that it moves and functions as a mountain bike? Or is it a bit of both? What about if the mountain bike has a wheel missing: can it then be called a mountain bike if we define a bike in its characteristic of being able to move and transport a person from place to place? Can it still be called a bike just because it is similar to our knowledge schema of it? What about a bike that is left to rust for many many years and is no longer functional? Is a bike still a bike even if it can therefore change its formation from time to time?



A key ontological question here is: does a mountain bike really exist in itself, in its own form within reality, or does the mountain bike exist in accordance with the internal knowledge schema and successful mapping of this schema onto reality? It can be tentatively suggested here that a bike or a form of a bike really exists independent of our knowledge of that bike whether a person knows of a bike or not. A mountain bike might not exist in a person’s world, but that is not to suggest that it doesn’t exist at all: it has simply yet to be discovered. Now this is important because if we say that a mountain bike really exists in reality then we simply discover it, and the knowledge schema in our minds about a bike’s formation is simply an interpretation of what it really is. Another, shorter, example: some argue that a tree is a tree because it is a tree: it exist independently of our imagination and our minds therefore it is simply waiting to be discovered and not perceived or constructed. Others argue that a tree is a tree because we define or interpret it as a tree: a tree still needed to be defined in the first place as a tree, therefore its general shape and behaviour is interpreted as a tree.


What I am thinking currently is, in order to perceive an object of reality, that object has to have existed or exist in some form within the external reality. We simply could not have perceived a tree to be a tree or a bike to be a bike if some sort of formation that led to such definitions had not existed in the first place. Therefore in the context of my research work on learning processes within the social sciences, there has to be an independent reality or, more likely, there has to be aspects of learning processes that exist independently of my own understanding and knowledge of those aspects and independent of the understanding and knowledge of the participants. When we think about an interpretivist perspective, surely my interpreting of these aspects or objects of a learning process entail the existence of these objects, but those interpretations are what they are: fallible notions and theories of what is going on, and therefore susceptible to constant revision.


Therefore, interpretation is different to construction; interpretive philosophy, therefore, has to be different in form and function to constructivism philosophy despite them sharing aspects of relativism and subjectivism; but at the moment I find it difficult to adhere completely to an interpretive philosophy because I have the belief that aspects of reality exist independently from our interpretations. All interpretations are not necessarily wrong, but it might be the case where certain interpretations are closer to what is really going on in reality than other interpretations, but in what way can this be known? Can we really find out exactly what is going on in reality? Will it really be the case that our interpretations could match exact reality? This might be difficult to realise, because of the complex backgrounds that researchers bring to data analysis of learning processes and also dependent on what aspect of the learning process they are exploring. But if the learning process or even aspects of the learning process really exists, what aspects are they? And, in what way can I tell if they really exist or if I just perceive them to really exist?


More questions can be asked: what does this all mean for an interpretivist and constructivist methodology? Remember my previous blog post about methodological liberalism: I do not believe that methodology has to be tied to a particular philosophy; therefore in my research the case study methodology and grounded theory method can align with either realism or interpretivism. But what are the implications on case study and grounded theory?

I have starting points, backed up with the firm epistemological belief that our knowledge of reality is simply an interpretation of objects, object behaviours and of their relationships, and each researcher therefore shall attain different knowledge and understanding of these objects and their relationships relative to their experiences and knowledge of the phenomena of investigation. This does not suggest, though, that there are actually multiple realities but does suggest that to some extent there are independent objects and object behaviours that are interpreted by us. As mentioned, all interpretations would not be completely right, but some might be more right than others. I have starting points so I will be building up on these.


Ideas and arguments are continuously developing, but currently in the context of my own research some questions are: what exactly are the aspects that are independent of the mind, and what aspects are dependent? To what extent, therefore, can I claim to be a realist or an interpretivist? And, although I shall be able to ground my own interpretations of the data within the data itself, in what way can I judge which interpretations and hypotheses accurately reflect reality the most? Therefore, what would be the criteria for this grounding? Would my interpretations be different to others, and if so to what extent? And in what way would this affect the validity and reliability of the new theory?


And, no, I’m not going to talk about perceptions of fairies and pixies!


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